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* CORPORATIONS AIJD EXPRESS TRUSTS
AS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS.*
Advantages Claimed.
p) RESIDENT Bui.
of Columbia University is reported to
have said in an address before the New York Chmber of
Commerce in 1911, that "the limited liability corporation is the
greatest single discovery of modem times, whether yoii judge it by
its social' by its ethical, by its industrial, or, in the long runafter we understand it and know how to use it,-by its political,
effects." 1
in 1912, in a paper submitted to the Tax Commissioner of Massachusetts, Alfred D. CHANDLEP, Of tfie Boston Bar, said "Express
Trusts, whether created under wills, deeds of settlement, assignments for the benefit of creditors, receiverships, or b7 special declarations of trust, to manage property or carry on business, -are
neither corporations nor joint stock companies, nor partnerships,
but they employ a distinct and the-highest known method of administratio11.2
The latest Statistical Abstract shows that in x9T3, there were in
the United States 305,336 corporations, with over $96,oooooo,ooo
of stock and bonds, with an income of over $3,8oooodooo, and payin& a tax to the Federal government of over $350oooooo.

The

-stock and bonds together represent nearly or quite two thirds of
the wealth of the whole country. In 4 yekrs, i909-i913, the number

of corporations increased over 4oooo, and the stock and bonds over
$12,0OO,OO.Oo0.*
Address before the North Dakota State Bar Association, Sept. 7, 1914.
'The Government and the Corporations, by Francis Lynde Stetson, zzo At. 31.,
P. 7, a (July, 1913) quoting from Pres. Butler.
*Expres Trusts under the Common Law, by Alfred Chandle, p. a. Little,
rown. & Co. 2gas.
OUnited States Stafltles1Abstrt4 zgz. 9.
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In conservative Massachusetts in the five years, _z9q7-19ir, about
6,5oo corporations were created; and during the same period over
4,p0 were dissolved by the legislatume. In igz, it was reported
that 4,0oo California corporations would be dissolved for failure to
pay a license tax, and 4,0o more in Missouri for failure to file the
nual anti-trust stateinent. This shows an extraordinary mortality

among corporations in these states.'
In x912, Express Real Estate* Trusts in Boston ilone owned
$2A5ooo,ooo of property and there had been no deaths among 17of
them in 14 years.
In z9o5, President SiMmoNs of the Fourth National Bank in
New York, and of the New York Stock Exchange, said: "The extension of the principle of ircorporation his enabled leaders in business
to set up two standards of morality, to maintain a Jekyll and Hyde
duality, and to do as members of an impersonal and non-moral corporate body acts which they would shrink from as individuals.. In"
privhte life they are stainless, but in the interests of corporations,
* * * they will have recourse to every villainy damned in the
decalogue.'O And in x19o, President WILSON, in his address before the American Bar Association pleaded "earnestly for the individualization of responsibility within the corporation, for the establishment of the principle of law that a man has no more right to
do wrong as a member of a corporation than as an individual'
D,"It ii said--and appeal is
On the other hand to quote MMAT=
made to long experience,--that men are more conscientious when
they are doing acts in their own names-than"when they are using the
name bf a corporation.". "A very high degree not only of honesty,
but of diligence has been required of trustees.' "'No higher.-standards of administrative conduct are evoked by Courts thli -those

which trusts require#-'

Speca Advantages of Cortoraiow.
The advantages of incorporation have long been recognized and
frequently 'referredto in the literature of our law. More than sk
hundred years ago, BPRAcToN said: "If an abbot,.or prior ***
'1Chander, Eapmei Trsts p. a,~ &hd Suplement

OReport of Tax Comm1ssonr (Wim. D..T. Trehy). MUs. 1Z4 p. Is. Chandler,
Zapem Trusts. P. it.
*As quoted by Cksnder, .Epre Trusts, p. ao. from the New York Dilly Tribne,

Oct. 2,zoI

'The lAwyer.and the Communlty, Am. Bar Assn. Rep., 2gao, pp. 419, 433L

-$Maitland, Trust'& Corporatioa, Cofleeted Pap=4 VoL UIL p. 362.
Ito.P.4

T,&
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claim land in the name of -their church upon the sesin of their pre-.
decessors*** the declaration should not be from abbot to abbot,
or prior to prior, nor should there be mention of the intermediate
abbots or priors, because in colleges and in chapters the same corporation always remains, although they all die successively and
others are substituted in their place, as may be said of flocks of
sheep, where there is always the same flocik, although all the
sheep or heads successively depart, nor does any individual of them
succeed to another by right of succession in such manner that the
right descends by inheritance froar'one to another, because the
right always pertains to the church, and remains with the church.
* * * And accordingly if the abbot or the prior,'the monks or
canons successively die, the house remains to eternity."n
BLAciScsToNz writing five centuries later than BRACtoz, and at the
very beginning of the application of science and invention to industrial conditions, in anything like mo4ern ways, says in summing up
the corporation law of his time:-"To show the advantages of .these incorporations, let us consider
the case of a college in either of our universities, founded ad ahdendum et orandum, for the encouragement and support of religion and learning. If this were a mere voluntary assemblyj the
individuals which compose it might indeed read, pray, study, and
perform scholastic exercises together, so long as they could agree
to do so; but they neither frame, nor receive any laws or rules of

of their conduct; none at least which would have any binding force,

for want of coercive power to create a sufficient obligation. Neither
could they be capable of retaining any privileges or immunities;
fo,"if such privileges be attacked, which of all this unconnected
assembly has the right, or ability, to defend them? And, when
they are dispersed by death or otherwise, how shall they transfer
these advantages to another set of students, -equally unconnected
as themselves? So, also, with regard to holding estates or other
property, if land be granted for the purposes of religion or learning
to twenty individuals nbt incorporated, there is no legal way of continuing the property to any other persons for the same purposes,
but by endless conveyances from one to the other, as often as the
hands are changed. But when they are consolidated and united into
a corporation, they and their successors are then considered .as one
person in law; as one person, they have one will, which is collected
.from the sense of the majority of the individuals; this one will may
establish rules and orders for the regulations of the whole, which
"'Bracton. Treatise an Laws of Z.,hsI4, (c. z264), VoL S. Twis Zd pp. 447-446
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are a. sort of municipal laws of this little republic;, or rules and
statutes may be prescribed to it -atits creation, which are then in the
place of natural laws; the privileges and immunities, the estates and
pogessions, of the corporation, when once vested in. them, will be
forever jested, without any-new conveyance to new successions; for
all the individual members that have existed from the foundation to
the present time, or that shall ever hereafter exist, are but one person
in law, a person that never dies; in like manner' as the river Thames
is still the same river, though the parts which compose it are changing every instant."
In 1819 Ch.ief justice MARSHALL put it this way: "A corporation
is an -artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.- Being the mere. creature of law, -itpossesses only
those properties which the charter of' its creation confers upon it,
either expressly or as incidental to its very existence. These arp
such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object for which"
it was created. Among. the most important are immortality,.and,
if the expression may be allowed, individuality: properties by which
a perpettral succession of many'persois are considered as the same,
and may act as a single, individual. They enable a corporation to
mamge its own affairs and to-hold property without the perplexing
intricacies, the hazardous and endless necessity of perpetual conveyances for the purpose of trahsmitting.it from hand to hand. It is
chiefly for the purpose of clothing the bodies of men in succession
with those -qualities and capacities that corporations were invented
and are in use. By these mbans:a perpetual succession of individuals
are capable of acting for.the pr6motion of the particular object, like
one immortal being".
Specid Advantages -of HExpress Trusts.
Upon the other hand the special advantages of Express Trusts
have recently been stated as follows :".
(i) These -associations have been found by the experience. of
twenty-five years to be a convenient, safe and .unobjectionable method of cobperative ownership and management.
(2) The form of organization ensures a continuity of manige-

ment and control which appeals strongly to investors in real estate,
which cannot be secured' by a corporation with changing officers.

The trustees who are'the .managirrg officers of a trust are not so
likely to be changed as are the director* of a corporation.
2Bladmtone, Commentaries, (s765), CX ts, Of Coporadoml
2 Trustees of- Dartavouth College v. Woodwrd, 0z). 4 What. (I0

" Report of Tax Commisioner of Mew., asis, P. at.

U. S.) S,8..
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(3)It affords a more -economical and more convenient and flexible form of management than does a corporation. Trustees can
transact business with more ease and rapidity than directors.
"In the early development of uses a device was stiuck upon that
gave permanence as Well as relief from the various fetidal burdens.
This was the joint tenancy. An :owner will convey his land to a
party of friends, to hold as joint tenants. "There will then.be no
inheritance, and no relief, wardship, marriage. By keeping up the
wall of joint tenants, by feoffment and refeoffment, he can keep
out the lord and can reduce the chances of reliefs and so forth to
nothing."" ' There is here no inheritance, only acerescence. 16
Mr. MAITLAND names "a few typical instances of unincorporated
bodies" that have lived behind the trustee wall for long periods of
years." He says "Imagine a foreign tourist, with Baedeker in hand
visiting one of our 'Inns of Court,' let us say Lincoln's Inn. He
sees the .chapel and the library and the dining hall; he sees the exfernal gates that ire shut at night. *. * * On inquiring he hears of

an 2ncient constitution that had taken'shape before r422. * * * You
have here.a Privatez'erein which has not even juristic personality.
* *

Its members might diide -the property that is held ior-them.
by trustees. * * *. The English judges who -receiveid and repeated
.*

a great .deal of the canonistic learning about corporations***
were to a man menbers of these * * and had never found that
the want of juristic personality was a serious misfortune1T
Then there are (or were until 6 weeks ago) the ships of Commerce carrying the name of Lloyds into all-the seas of the world;
almost from the beginning there was among these insurers of the
world's commerce only a very loose oiganization with the exclusive
use of a coffee hdlse,; and a small trust fund,- until the trust deed
of 18xi was executed with over tioo signatures, and until x87z
"it was an unincorporated Verein, without the least trace (at least
so we said) of juristic personality about it." It was incoriporated
in 187!, because in that year there was recovered from the ZuyderZee, a large mass of treasure that had been lying there since 1799,
and, because of the destruction of records by fire, it belongedJb no
.one could say whom.1 8
There is also the London Stock Exchange, beginning in 1773. when
the name was "wrote over the door" at New Johnathan's Coffee
I-ouse. "In i8o2 a costly site was bought, a costly building erected,
"Maitland, Lecture on

quityp.
p. aE&

3 Maitland, Trust & Corporation, Collected Papers, VoL I 1. 336.
"I Maitland, Tzust & Corporation, Collected Paperm, VoL III, p. 369-37z.
18 . p.71-373.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

76

and an elaborate constitution was formulated in "a deed of settlement." There was a capital of £2ooo divided into 4oo shares. Behind the trustees stood a body of "proprietors,' who had found the
money.; and behind the "proprietors" stood a much larger body of
"members" whose subscriptions formed the income that was divided
among the "proprietors." "In 1876 there was a new deed of settlement; in 1882 large changes were made in it; there was a capital of
124.ooo divided into 2oooo sharei. * * * The organization is of
a high type. * * * In 1877 a Royal Commission * * * recommended that the Stock Exchange should be incorporated," abd th9 bye
laws be made subject to the approval of the Board of Trade. "That
was the Cloven hoof. Zx pede diabolum:" It was not incorporated,
yet MAITrrD says: "it would not, I think, be easy to find anything
that a corporation could do that is not being done by this sicht
rechtsfdhige Verebs" (society without legal capacity)." The Ney
unincorporated.
York Stock Exchange also is
MAiT.AND, with his delightful humor, says again: "I believe that
in the eyes of a large number of my fellow countrymen, the most
important and august tribunal in England is not the House of
Lords but the Jockey Club. * * * Some gentlemen form a club,
buy a race course, the famous Newmarket Heath, which is conveyed to trustees for them, and then they can say who shall and
who shall not be admitted to it. I fancy, however, that some men
who have been excluded from this sacred heath. ("warned off New
Market Heath" is our phrase), would have much preferred the
major excommunication of that "historic organism" the Church of
Rome.'"
This reference to the Church justifies further quotation from
MAiTLAND. He says "All that we English people mean by "religious
liberty" has been intimately connected with the making of trusts.
* * * If in 1688 the choke had lain between conceding no toleration at all and forming corporations of Nonconformists," they
would have been "Untolerated for a long time to come, for in England, as elsewhere, incorporation meant privilege and exceptional
favour. And, on the other hand, there were among the Noncon
formists many who would have thought that even toleration was
dearly purchased if their religious affairs were subjected to State
control * * * If the State could be persuaded * * * to repeal a
few persecuting laws * * * Trust would do the rest * * *. Trust
* Anhd now we have in England Jewish Syn**
soon did the rest
agogues and Catholic cathedrals and the churches and chapels of
pma4.
OIL 9.
JInb. p. E.
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countless sects. They are owned by natural persons. Thy are
owned by trustees."'1
In this way were the lands of the Methodist churches and chapels
held throughout England and the United States, under model deeds
used by John Wesley in the very beginning of his ministry to the
effect that the trustees, for the time being should permit Wesley
himself, and such other persons as he might4 from time to time ap-.
point, to have the free use of such premises, to preach therein God's
holy word, and after his death "for the sole use of such persois as
might be appointed by the yearly conference,"n these deeds were
confirmed and made perpetual under his deed of trust of z784, establishing the Methodist General Conference of roo, and which has
been called the Magna Charta of that church n
. And although our Supreme Court has recently held, following
the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, that the Roman Catholic Church is a corporation "which antedates by almost a thousand
years any other personality in Europe," yet:the great "organized
operative institution" known as the Established Church of Englind,
tracing its existence back to Theodore of Tarsus, 669 A. D. "is not
a corporate body.""
It would seem from these illustrations, that other institutioni
known to the law based upon trusteeships rival in duration and permanence the immortality of corporations.
It is my purpose to compare these two,--Corporations and Express Trusts,-in such detail. as my time will permit, to discover, if
perchance we may, 'something of the strength and weakness of each,
for business purposes, under present day conditions.
Theory of Corporate

istuce. '"

A recent definition by Chief Justice BALw N of the Connecticut
Supreme Court, says a corporation is "an association of persons to
whom the sovereign has offered a franchise to become an artificial,
- lb. pp. 363-364.
is We and Times of Yohn Wesley. by L. Tyerma, VoL s, P. 419; Lost ChaPtu
from Early. History of American Methodism, y JT.
B. Wakeley, p. s8 where a ciorp of
the deed for a Methodist Preaching-house, on John Street, k. Y., dated Nov. a, svy7,
is pive.
0Tyerman, p. 421.
"6Barlin v. Ramh"z,9(xo6). 7 PhiL 41; Poce v. Roman Catholi Church (zo).
2to U. S. a96; Santos Y. Roman Catholic Church (igog), isxU. S. 46s.
3 Eucye. of Laws of England, p. 24;-s Stephen's Comtnentaries, 16th Ed. (1914),
p. o6; is Halsbury's The Laws of England, p. 37sz,
See. W06(Ecclesiastica Law).
2 Bibliography:
Angeli and Ames, Law of Private Corporations, Introduction and Ch. . (st Z&
s83z, and subsequent -editions.)
Baldwin, S. Z. History of the Law of Private Corporations in the Colonies and-
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States, Yale Bicen. Pub. go, p. 261, 3 Select Essays, Anglo-Ax. Legal Hgt., p. a36;
Freedom of Incorporation, (in Modern Political Institutions, =89$).
Blackstone, Sir Win., Commentaries (1765), Bk I, Ch. Xwii
Brissaud, J., History, of French Private Law, Continental Legal History Sees
(1912), pp. 889go5.
Brown, NV. Jethro, The Austinlan Theory of Law, (99o6), pp. 24-70; The Personality of the Corporation and the State, at Law Quart. Rev. 365.
Carr, Cecil Thomas, Early Forms of Corpoxateness. Ch. IX, in General Principles
161;
of the Law of Corporatidns, 3 Select Essays, Azglo-Am. Legal Hist. (0gos), p.
Select Charters of Trading Companies, :53o-z7o. Selden Society, VoL al (1913).
11896).
Cawston and Keane, The Early Chartered Companies, sz864lzS
Clark and Marshall, Private Corporations, Vol 1, Ch. L
Davis. John P., Corporations, A Study of Origin and Development, (igos); Nature
of Corporations, is Polit. Science Qua'. 23.
Person, 57 Am. Law Reg. (0. S.) s:, .(:go).
Deiser, George F., The Juristic
Elliot, C. B., Private Corporations, Ch. 1, (1897).
Evans, F., The Evolution of the English Joint Stock, 'radlng Company, 3 Colombia L. R. 339. 461 (i9o8); What is a company? s6 Law Quart. Rev. 29-z64.
PolitFreund, E, Legal Nature of Corporations, University of Chicago Studies in
ical Science.
Geldart, W. M., Legal Peranality, 27 Law Quart. Rev., go (x9210).
Gierke, 0., Political Theories of Middle Age, tr. by. F. W. Maitland (1g3), Itroduction pp. viii-xliii, 67-73,'with notes.
Holdsworth. W. S.,. History of English Law, VoL 3. P. 369-376..
Ner.
Johnson, A. B., Legislative History of Corporations in New York,, to Hunt's
chant's Magazine, 6:o (185o).
Kent, James, Commentaries, (i8*7), VoL II, Lec. 3s.
Xyd, S., Corporations (x79S), IntUoduction.
Machen, A. NV. Jr., Corporate Personality, 24 Harv. Law Rev., (tgoz), pp.-' s3 347.
Maitland, F. W., The Crown as Corporation. 3 Coll. Pap. pp. 44-a7o; The Uninpp. s8s-303; Moral Personcorporated Body, lb., pp. *7Z-284;The Body VPlitie, .,
ality and Legal Personality, lb., pp. 3o4-32o; Trust and Corporation, lb., pp. 32s-404.
See also 14 Journal Comp. Leg.. p. 19*.
. z-s. "
Manson E., Evolution of the Private Compa, *6 Law Quart. Rev.,
s:oMle
Merritt, W. W., Some Views of the Nature and Effect of Vorporateness,
Law Rev., p. 31o (igia).

Miraglia, Luigi, Comparative Legal Philosophy, (Vol 1I1. Modern Legal. Philos-

ophy Series, tr. by John Lisle, 1912), Ch. III, Inqorporeal Persons, pp. 361-381
Moore, J. H., Development of Corporation Law in.this Country, Ark. Bur Assn.
Rep. (1o9). PP. 45-81.

Morawetz, V., Private Corporations, Preface, sd Fd. (:88).

Pike, L. 0., Introduction to Year Book, z6 Ed. II, partk I, p.xlvL
Law RePollock, Sir F., Contracts, 6th Fd., soS; 7th.Ed., 13; Has the Common
ceived the Fiction Theory of Corporations? 27 Law Quart. Rev. 2zp (1g::).
Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, pp. 469511, 66*48L
Radin, Max, Legislation of Greeks & Romans n Corporations (gog).'
Rashdall, JL, The Universities and the Legislature, aj Law Quart. Rev., 76"84
(1913).
Raymond, R. L., The Genesis of a Corporation, 29 Harv. Law Rev. 35o (3906).
Salmond, J. ., Jurisprgdence, Ch. XV, (3d Ed xgxo).
Scot, V. R., Constitution and Finance of Enklish & Irish Joint Stock Companes
to t720, 3 Vo.. (191o-zgs).
42 A,
Seymour, .E. B., History of the Common Law Conception of a Corporation.

L. Reg. (N. S.),

9*go, .

5*9.

Sheppard, Win., Corporations, Fraternitis and Guild (z6s9).
Smith, H. A., The Persons Ficts, A6 Jurid. Rev., pp. "59-74 (1914).
I,
Sohm, R., The Institutes df the Roman Law. Ledlie's trans., ad Ed. (spoz). Ch.
I - 195-234.
State Trials, (King v. City of London),'Vol. 8, PP. 1o3-s358 (S6b);
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juridical person, with a name of its own, under which they can act
and contract, and sue and be sued, and who have accepted the offer
and effected an organization in substantial. conformity' with its
terms."' ....
There are three fundamental ideas here: A corporation is a new
person in the law resulting from the acceptance of a franchise to
become such, by an associationof persons.
The first of these,-thata corporation is a person6,x sepaate from
its members, has already been referred to as its chief characteristic
and advantage. This idea of the personality and unity of a group
is not new but old, almost as old as-language. We are told nowadays that the primitive mind of man had 9 more definite and positive
idea of the unity and solidarity of the horde, or pack, or-clan or
tribe of savage hunters and warriors, than it had of the personality
of its individual members.".
Among all the Aryan peoples,-Hindu, Greek, Roman, Teuton,
or Slav,--the oldest artificial person seems to have been. the family.s ,The Ancient Egyptians and Babylonians personified the Tenpie.k1 Long before JusTiNiAN all the members of a corporation were
considered one person or body in the Ronl n Law."
The canonists of the 13th century call it a persona ficta, not
found in the. world of sense,, but created by law, invisible, immortal,
a body that has no body and *no soul; it. cannot sin, or be excomSutton's Hospital Cise, so Coke Rep., pp. s-33 (;6S).

Taylor. H. 0., Private Corporations, Pre aces, and Cs. I-IV. (1884 and subsequent editions).
Trapnell, Benj., The :Logical Conception of a Corporation, West Virginia -Bar
Assn. Report 1896, Appendix to Clark on Corporations, sst . , p. 64.
Truitees of Dartmouth College y. Woodws:4 4 Wheat. (U. S.) SL

Wilgus, H. I.; Corporation Cases, pp. x-s6y with notes (zgoo).
Williston, Samuel, History of the Law of Business CorporatIons before z8oo, a
Harv. Law Rev., 105, 149 (z888). s Select Fjsays Ango-Am. Legal'Hist . :95.

Wormser, I. M., Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity (xgz2),.zz Col. Law Rev.
496.

Wright, A. G., The California State Tax on Corporate Franchises, x Cal. Law Rev.

91, (1913).
Young, H. H., Legal Personality of a Foreign Corporation. 22- Law Quart. Rev.
X78 (19o6).
Foreign Companies and Other Corporations, Cambridge University Press,
192.
(The foregoing bibl'3grapby includes only such works as contain important matte'"

relating to corporate theory or history.)

ffMackay v. N. Y., N. IL & H. R. R. (igog), 82 Conn. 73, 8, 72 AtL 583.
= See particularly in bibliography given in note 26 above, Blackstone, Brissau
Brown, Carr, Deiser, Freund, Geldart, Gierke, Michen, Maitland, Miragis,
Pike, Pol.

lock, Salmond, Seymour. Sohm, Wilgus.
s Morawett. 1 1, p. S.
"Hearn. The Aryan Household, pp. 64-.
mJohns, C. H. WV., Babylonian & Assyrian Laws, Contracts & Letters, CIL. XX
(1904); Simcox, H. J., Primitive Civilizations, Vol. 1; pp. zsz-sy.
2Amos, Shcldon, History and Principles of Civil Law of.Rome, p. ,sS
.
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municated, nor commit a crime, and probably not a tort. 2 Early in
the 14th century these words were being repeated in the year books
of English law by the English judges. In 1311 it was considered
a body (un corps), existing-per se, and not appendant or appurtenant to something else. 3 ' And only a short time ago Mr. Justice
McKENNA, of the United State Supreme Court said "Undoubtedly
a corporation is in law, a person or entity entirely distinct from its
stockholders and officers!'" It is such, for the most part, in relation to outside parties; it has rights of property and reputation, and
is subject to general duties under the common law and statutes;
and is also considered a person as to ownership of property, and
suing and being sued, and in considerable measure it is so under
the protection of constitutional and treaty provisions"
The second of thes,--that a corporation results from the acceptance of a franchiseT from the state,-although now so frequently
criticized or belittled, historically has been as importint as the per:sonality of the corporation. In fact in legal theory, the privilege,
the franchise itself, is the capacity of separate personality, conferred
upon the group. The legal ideas involved come from the Roman
and from the Feudal law. From the Roman, the franchiseis a privilege of a public nature conferred by the state for political or public
reasons. Anciently perhaps in Greece and Rome groups o.f persons were associated without authority of the state, and acted much
as a single person; but the Romans were jealous of suh and many
laws were made against illicit companies between the Twelve Tables
(45o B. C.) and the Empire;,Caesar'and Augustus did the-same;
and in the time of Gaius, and Marcian, corporations could be created only under special or general legislative authority."
The same Political theory of corporate existence prevailed in the
middle ages. "The corporation is and must be the creature of the
state. Into its nostrils the state must breathe the breath of fictitious
life, for otherwise it would he no animated body but individualistic
dust."" In the Year Books of our law in 1376, it was ruled that
Pollock & Maitland, Hist. Eg. Law, p. 477. Note Wilgus's Cases, pp. 7-79
My. B., 4 Ed. II, xo3; Y. B., t6 Ed. III; Pike's Introductikn.
McCaskill Co. v. U. S. (gipo), 2t6 U. S. so4, S34. And Cave, .., In re Sheffield
etc. Society (889), says "A corporation is a legal person just as much as an individual."
L. R. 22 Q. B. D. 470 -0 476.
m See Cases, Wilgus, Corp. Cases, pp. 33" .
IT See bibliography in note 26 above, particularly, Blackstone, Gierke, (Maitland's
tr. Introdue., pp. xxxi-xxxviii), Kent, State Trials, Trustees Dart. Coll. Y. Woodward
(Washington's Opinion), Wilgus, (Corp. Cases. pp. 123.170), Wright.
" Kent, Comm., Vol. 2, pp. a6&9; Taylor's EL Civil Law, pp. 567-57c; Digest,
xlvii, 22, Z and 3 (Marcian); Digest, iii, 4, x (Gains).
9 Maitland's Summary. in Cierke's Pol. Th. of Mid. Ages, p.
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"none but the king can makc a corporation." 0 And as we all know
with us today "the right to form a private corporation can only be
acquired from the state."
From the Feudal law this privilege was not merely a personal privilege, but was looked upon as a privilege of a property kind. The
Medieval mind had a peculiar tendency to look upon all sorts of
immaterial or incorporeal things and privileges as property; as for
example. the right of advowson. Feudal rights *and incidtnts, too
intangible to be called holdings, were yet considered property in the
Medieval law.u" In x69! it was said "the whole frame and essence
of the corporation consist" of the franchises which are "the ligaments of this body politic."' 2 COmYsS says in i74o, "A corporation

is a franchise created by the" king." B.ACKSTONz and KzNT say the
same. Such a view is not dead nor sleepeth yet. It was the real
basis of Mr. Justice WASHINGTON'S decision in the Dartmouth College case." In 1887, Mr. Justice BRAvtx said: "A franchise is a
right of public concern. * * * No persons can make themselves a
body corporate and politic without legislative authority. Corporate
capacity is a franchise.""' Ten years ago the Supreme Court of
California said "The right to be and exist as a corporation is a
grant by the sovereign power, a valuable right" and subject to taxation." And just the other day it was said: "A corporate franchise
is the right to exist as an entity for the purpose of doing things permitted by law."." And the exercise of such right is subject to taxation.,s
The third of these,-that a corporation is really an association or
collection of individuals, is strongly insisted upon by Mr. Morawetz
and Mr. T-aylor. Mr. Morawetz says: It is "essential to bear in mind
distinctly that the rights and duties of an incorporated association,
are in reality, the rights and duties of the persons who compose it,
not of an imaginary being."" And Mr. Taylor: There are "two
a y. B-. 49 FA IMI 27.

.
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464 Wheat. Sit as 6S7, (ss).
* California v. Central Paie R,. Co., ts7 U. S. z, 4e.
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meanings of the term corporation; the one, the sum of legal relations subsisting in respect to the corporate enterprise; the other the
organic body of shareholders, whose acts cause the operation of the
rules of law in the e6nstitution. These two conceptions include
all that is really connoted by the term in whatever sense used. And,
if so, what has become of the venerable 'legal person'? Is he still
somewhere, as he has aways been imagined? Or is he nowhere as
he has always actually been? Shall we say he is the combination,
the mystic unification of our two conceptions? Better not; better
forget him."

Theory of the Trut.51
Trusts of course are the creati6n of the English courts of
equity. As MAITLATD says, "Of all the exploits of equity the
largest and most important is the invention and development of the
"Taylor, Private Corp., Preface, It 48-5s. See Note Wilgus Case p. xIl.
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Trust. It is an institute8 of.great elasticity and generality; as elastic,
as general as contract.'
Our trust is refined from the doctrine of uses as they -were
established in our law before the Statute of UM &' The older
writers traced uses to the, R6man fidei-commira, introduced in
the Roman law, 17o years B. C. to evade'the laws proh'biting the
appointing of a daughter, stranger or an exile as an heir. The
.testator devised his property to a qualified citizen" as his heir, universal devisee, or- executor, with a request, by precatory Words,
depending only on the good faith or'honor, strong in the R6man
breast, of such heir to restore or. hand over the inheritance, or a
part of it, to the designated person. - To secure the .enforcement of
the request the testator implored or appealed to the Emperor, to
AuGusTus, who flattered by such appeal, on"tie advice of a committee of jurisconsults, made these requests obligatory, under the
direction" of the Consuls; and later under MARcus Auuus, a
praetorwas appointed to.enforce them, acting extra ordinem I"
mD, doubt the .dirct
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is already, employing it; by the intermediation of a third person,
whom he puts in seisin of his lands and goods, he succeeds in appointing or adopting an heir."" MAITLAND finds the same thing in
the Lombard law. He says: "The Lombard cannot make a genuine
testament. He therefore transfers the whole or some part of his*
property to a Trefihander, who is to carry out his instructions.""
Mr. Justice HoLMss says- that "The feoffee to uses of the
early English law, corresponds point by point to the Salman
of the early German law. * * * The Salman, like the feoffee, was
a person to whom land was transferred in order that he iht
make a conveyaice according to his grantor's directions, * * *
usually after the grantor's death, the grantor reserving the use of
the land himself during his life. To meet the chance of the Salman's death before the time for the conveyance over, it was common to employ more than one, arid persons of importance were
selected for the office. The essence of the relation ,vas the fiducia
or trust reposed in the fidelis man=, who sometimes confirmed his
obligation by an oath or covenant. * * * The executor of the
early German will vas.simply a Salman whose duty it was to see
legacies and so forth paid if the heirs refused. * * * There can
be no doubt of the identity of the continental executor and the
officer of the same name described by GLANvILLE (zi8o); and thus
the connection between the English and the'German law is made
certain."
"The beneficiary had however no action to compel the performance of the duty of the continental Saidn,"s and "the transformation of the honorary obligation of the feoffee into a legal obligation was a purely English development."" -This duty was enforced
against executors in the case of bequests of personal prok'ty, in
the ecclesiastical courts, and possibly to some extint in the case of
lands devisable by custom in some of the cities.
For a long time even before the Conquest the term use had been
in use, but yet as MAITLAND wittily says, it has "mistaken its own
origin." The word is not the Latin "usus" (L e. a using of a
thing), but the Latin opus. From the 7th and 8th centuries, ad opus,
for "on his behalf," is found in Lombard and Frank documents;
ITTrust and

Corporations, 3 CoIl. Papers, p. 327.
- Holmes Early Eng. Equity, z Law Quart. Rev. 168-174 (85s); Select Zama
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in the Old French these-become"al-oes, ues," which the English
tongue, confused with "use." The Latin records however read ad
opu,--ad opus Johanis,i.e. on behalf of John. As far back as
Domesday Book, one person is constantly doing thingt ad opus an.
other; the Sheriff seizes 'fad opus Regis, as os e Roy!" If one..&
going on a crusade he occasionally conveyed his land to another
to be held to the use of his children, or his wife or sister, for he
was not certain whether a'womian could hold'a military fee, or
whether he could enfeoff his wife. So. too, a man might want to
give his property to a convent, to the use of the library, or the
hospital. And when the Franciscan friars came as missionaries to'
the Fnglish towns, about :22, with their rule forbidding them to
own .anything, the faithful benefctor, who wanted to give them
*some poor dormitory in which to live and sleep, struck upon the
curious plan of conveying a house -to the borough community "t6
the use of," or "as .an inhabitation for" the friars. And by the
time of BRAcTo, "plots of land in London had been thus conveyed to the city for the benefit of the Franciscians."" This was..
in the i3th.century.
-

In the x4th century, landowners began conveyig lands to their

friends ad opu. sum, to the use of thehselves. Why? Because.
they have found they can in effect make a will of their lands in
this way; for if -A conveys his land to B to hold on behalf of A
while he lives, and then when A dies to give it to some one"sug
gested by A before he dies, it is equivalent to a wilL The direct
devise. of lands under the feudal system had been denied to landowners for two or three centuries.. -Men especially among. the
great want to provide for their daughters and younger sons." john
of Gaunt wants to provide for his illegitimate children.. There were
other reasons also; to avoid.the feudal burdens of wardship, marriage, -forfeitures and escheats, the statutes of mortmain;--and perhaps also to defraud one's creditors." Between t396 and 1403 , the
Chancellor had interfered to. protect these beneficiaries and is
ordering defendants by the writ of subpmna, "to do whatever shall
be ordained by us," or to "do what right and ood faith or "good
faith and conscience" dmand, since the plaintiff "cannot have
remedy by the law of the Holy church nor by the common law;"
and one great doctrine, ',quity acts upon the pern," was taking
.MaM ZqutY. p. *4.
, Note, Pofl0ck aud MatWland iLt. e.'AD& Awo 2d4
xd., VOL U, V. 233.
*Pollock and Maitland, Hl Xn.
aw, VL s. ad X4. p. *S.
UMaland, Zqdty, pp. -Ma.
OAvMea Lecture an Legal Hlatmy. Osigin of Uses, Note a. . *A~ and note~~
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slhpe. "The law- regards chiefly the right of the plaintiff and gives
judgment' that he recover the land, debt, or damages because they
are his. Equity lays stress upon the duty of the defendant, -and.
decrees that he do or refrain from doing a certain thing because
he ought to act or forbear."",
This term 'ad-opu? in the early time was used also for what we
now use 'agency." In the. very ancient days both- in France and
England, a man, such as the King's officer, will receive money not
as agent of, but to the use of, ad ops, the king, or some one else;
and in time, where the party is authorized to do -some act in reference to money.or chattels on behalf of another, as where A's bailiffy B, takes A's corn to market, sells it, and buys cattle, ad opus
A, this develops into a law of agency, so that if B converts the corn
-or cattle or money received to his own use (ad opus suum proprium)
the common law will -recognize the wrong and furnish a remedy
in debt or account.6
It was. not so-however'in the case of land, although it looks much
like a contract, and there certainly is an agreement when "in-consideration of a conveyance made by A to X, Y, Z, they agree that
they will hold.theland for the behoof of A, will allow him to enjoy
it, and wil. convey it as he shall direct."" Why is this not a contract; and .why did the courts not enforce it? -There, are two
or' three reasons: (x) The feofee did not formally promise, or
cbv.enant tnder his seal.; (2) In the 14th century the common law
had not begun to enforce 'the simple contract and by the i5th
century when the simple contract began to be enforced in the courts
of -common law;". in an action of -assumpsit, the Chancellor was
*already in possession of this field of"jurisdiction and was already
enforcing uses by means of a procedure far more efficient atd far
more flexible than any which the old'courts could have empt6yed;
(3) Where-the promise was to convey as directed after the death
,of the feoffor, of course the feoffor could not -enforce it, his heir
would not,. foe it would be to his-interest not to do so; so the only
one wanting to enforce it would be the beneficiary; the court of
. Chancery early recognized this, and gave him the remedy, and even
in the earliest instancei where the trustor and the cestui que use"
are the same, still'it is as ."destinatory," not as %uthor of the
trust" that he has the remedy. This marks it off from contract.
(4) Then again if the feoffor who was also the cestid que use, had
0
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only a contract right, it would be a chose in action, and inalienable,
which the landowner did not Want.z
And so what kind of a right is this which the destinatory, the
beneficiary, the cestui que use, has? Is it a right in rcm or in per12
sonam.t To follow MAITLAND here: "'It seems a little of both."
"The right of cestui que use or cestui que trust begins by being a
right in personam. Gradually it .begins to look somewhat like a
right in rem." But it never "has become this, no, not even in the
present day." "The new class of rights is made to look as much
like rights in rem (estates in land) as the Chancellor can make them
look; that is in harmony with the real wish of the parties who are
using the device. They are also taking the common law as their
.model. Thus we get a conversion of the use into an incorporeal
thing,-in which estates and interests e.x'ist--a sort.of immaterialized piece of land."T' "The use came to be conceived of as a sort
of metaphysical entity in which there might be estates very similar
to those which could be created in land, estates in possession, remainder, reversion, estates desce.dible in this Way or that."75 But
it is "neither jus in re nor ad rem, neither right, title nor interest in
law, but a species of property unknown to the common law, ind
*owing its existence to the equitable jurisdiction of chancery, resting upon confidence in the person and privity of estate; * * * it
was rather a hold upon the conscience of the feoffee to uses than a
a lien upon, or interest in. the land; and the principle upon which
itwas founded was that the feoffee was bound in conscience to follow the direction of'the feoffor.""
"The trustee is the owner, the full owner of the thing, while the
cestui que trist has no rights in the thing.""
This thing,--the trust res, or trust fund owned by the trustee
the court of chancery converted into an incorporeal thing whiah
can change its dress but maintain its identity. "Today it appears.as
a piece of land; tomorrow it may be some gold coins tn. a purse;
"*Maitand, Equity, pp. a8-3z.
72lb., p. 23.
"lb., p. zg.
" lb., p. St.
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and II, Ch. 11, pp. 23S-278. Hart, WT.G., The place of trust in jurisprudence (rgis),
CaL
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then it will be a sum of Consols; then it will be shares in a Rail-

way Company; and then Peruvi.t Bonds. When all is going well,
changes of investment may often be made; the trustees have been
given power to make them. All .along the 'trust fund' retains its
identity. * * * But the same idea is applied even when all is not

going welL"'

Mr. 1AITLAND contends stoutly, and perhaps correctly, notwithstanding frequent loose statements to the contrary, that.the beneficiary has no right in the thing, in the trust fumd; the equitable
but essentially jura
estates and interests -arenot jura bs rem; ***
but rights against
large
at
world
the
against
rights
if&personam,not
-certain persons.7' Notwithstanding this, the beneficiary is treated
as having an estate in fee simple,' 61 in fee tail, or for life in the
use or trust, or an equitable estate; or as having a term of years in
the use or trust. These estates and interests were to devolve and
be transmitted like the analogous estates and interests known to
and protected by the common law. The equitable fee would descend
to heirs general, the equitable.estates tail to heirs in tail, equitable
chattel interests- would pass to the executors or administrators.
•*** The tquiiable estate or interest could be conveyed or assigned inter vivos; and they can be devised or bequeathed; curtesy

but not*. dower could behad in them; they did not escheat; and they
could be reached by a creditor of the beneficiay.
All these look like rights in rem. -Yet "the right of the cestui que

°
trust is the benetof an obligation,"" and is-available against not
the whole world, but only -against certain persons; these are: (z)
Ti trustee who has undertaken to hold in trust;. (2) "those who
come to.the lands or goods by inheritance or succession from the
original trustee, his heir, executors, administrators, or doweress;
(3).the trustees creditors; (4) the trustees donee, who takes with-

out giving a valuable consideration; (5)the purchaser -from the
trustee for value, who knows of the trust; (6) the purchaser from

the trustee who ought'to know-of the trust," "who would have
knovn of the trust hadhe behaved as prudent purchasers behaver:according to the estimate of equity judges,-and not of an lordinary
with
jury. If he did not come up to this standard'he was "affected
*
notic" or had "constructive notice," and was iot protected. '
'"uthere a limit was rea~hed.. Against'a person who acquires
a leVl right bo a ide, for value, without notice express or con"
M .s.s
PapeS, .IL
ad, a. C
U.,, au~~,Tr"t ,ad.co
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structive of the existence of equitable rights tho e rights
are of no
avail,"-and here is the difference between the beneficiary's
right,
and a true right in rem
Creation of Cortoratin&
Long ago, Lord Coxx in the Case of Sutton's Hospital,
said these
"things are of the essence of a corporation:
(i)-Lwful'authority
of incorporation; and that may be by four means, Sc.
by *thecommon law, as the King himself, etc.; by authority of
parliament;
by the King's Charter, (as in this case); and by prescription.
The
2d which is of the essence of the incorporation, are parties
to be incorporated, and that in-two manners, sc. persons natural,
or bodies
incorporate and political (3) A name by which they
are
incorporated, as in this case governors of the lands, etc. (4)
Of a place,
for without a place no incorporation can be made; here
the place
is in the charter house in the County of Middlesex. *
* * ($) By
words*sufficient in law, but not restrained to any certain
legal and
prescript form of words.""'
This statement, for the most part is ag applicable and
accurate
today as it was three hundred years ago when it was
written. We
yet have corporations existing by the common law,-as
the state
itself is a corporation, and our governors and officers
are corporations sole for certain purposes, by implication or necessity."
Public
corporations may exist with us by prescription, and
private also,
where the statute of limitations runs against the state
in quo warranto proceedings." We still have corporations in this
country that
exist by virtue of a King's charter granted before the
revolution, as
in the case of Dartmouth College.$ This method of
creating corporation's de novo, still exists in England, but of course
not with us;
and although Lord BATiMORt, under authority conferred
upon' him
by the Charter of Maryland in 1667 irjcorporated the
Mayor, Recorder, Aldermen and Common Council of the City
of St. Marys,
and William PENN, by a similar provision in the Charter
of Pennsylvania, in z7o granted a charter of incorporation to
the city of
a b., p. tig.
The Case of Suttons Hopital (26T3) 1o Coke s, sa
et seq., I Wilgus Case
V. 264.
"The Governor v. Allen (1847), 8 Humph. (27 Tenn.)
s, z Wilgm, Corp. Caes,
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Greene v. Dennis (W826). 6 Conn. *92, z6 Am. Dec. 8,
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278; State v. Pawtuxet Turnpike Co. (1867), 8 L 1.I2,
94 Arn. Dec. isa; People Y.
Oakland Co. Bank, z Doug. (Mich.) s8s.
"Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819),
4 Wheat. (17 U. S.). Sa,
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us in any executive.
Philadelphia,' no such power now exists with
the power to
revolution
or judicial office. And since-the American
bodies exlegislative
our
in
resided
create corporations, With us, has
5
our legislatures, is qualiclusively.' Such power, however, when in
the absence of confied only by constitutional limitations." And-in special or general
by
act
may
stitutional provision the legislature
existed at Rome." In
laws. General incorporation laws probably
was enacted by ParliaEngland the first general incorporation law
was made perpetual
this
ment in x597 for the erection of hospitals;
Second Institute
his
in
COKE,
Lord
and
in 1624; it is still in force,
under it.'" The
incorporation,
for
form
proper
gives the act and.a
that all
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and now almost every state constitution provides that the legislatures shall pass. no special act creating corporations or conferring
corporate powers, but all corporations shall be created under general
laws which shall be subject to amendment and repeal by the legislature at any time.3 Mr. FR&sT says special charters can be granted
in only seven states."
In speaking of the general incorporation laws, Mr. MACHEN says,

"The statutes in some states consist of a jumble of old acts thrown
together almost indiscriminately with more recent amendments. In
other states, the legisatures have intended to display the utmost liberality; but unfortunatelythis disposition has often-been evinced by
removing salutary restrictions and at the same 'time, in order to
make a show of legislative regulation, by imposing. vexatious and
unreasoning restraints.""
Mr. FROST says that "a great majority of the business corporation
acts in force in this country today are sadly in need of revision.
* * * The incorporation laws of Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Maryland are veritable "legal antiques," * * * and the acts of many of
the states are "wonderfully and fearfully made."" And every lawyer that has tried to find out the real meaning of the corporatibn
statutes of a single state, knows that such mild expressions are altogether too euphonious to do the subject justice.
Not only are incorporation laws notoriously uncertain in meaning, but they are inflexible so long as they last, and when, in what
way, and to what extent, they will be changed by the legislature,
Providence only, if -anyone, can tell.
Then again one must at his peril substantially comply with the
law whefher he can determine its meaning or not; and in many
states if he fails so to comply he can only say some sort of disaster
will follow, exactly what under the present state of authorities, he
cannot tell, for it is concealed in gremio legis et curiae;in one place
it will be de facto existence ;7 in another not;"8 in onea full part-

nership liability for members; in another an individual liability for
participants,"---but for all, even though they acted in good faith,
it will be something different from "what they intended.

i Private Corporations, Wilgus, p. xz8,. C;nst. Fa 1838, Art. z3, See. 2; Louisiana CdnSt. 3845; New York Const. iSaz, Art. .7, Se. 9; Const. :846, Art. 8, See. 3.
"Frost, incorporation and Organization of Corporations, p. s (4th Ed).
96Machen, Corp. p. 17.
-Frost, Inc. & Organ. Corp. pp. 3, 7 (4th Ed.).
a Finnegan v. Noerenberg (1893). Sa Minn. a39, 38 Am. St. Rep. Ss2,
Wilgus,
Cases, &'4.
.Kaiser v. Lawrence Say. Bank (:881), 56 Is. 1o4, 1 Wilgus; Cases 607; Bergvg
ron v. Hobbs (x897), 96 Wis, 64r, 6s Am. St. R. 8S, i Wilgus; Cases 611.
"Martin v. Pewell (1883). 79 Mo. 401 ,1 Wilgus, Cases 673, note- 05.
Fay v. Noble (zSgs), 7 Cush. (Man.). 188, i Wilgus, Cases, p. 6M, note 681.
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Then too it is difficult, if not impossible, unless the Supreme
Court has passed upon it, to say what is the period of corporate
gestation, when it begins or when it ends, when corporate birth
really occurs, when-corporate parturition is complete, when the urnbilical cord is cut. and the corporate "personality' is acquired. For
example, where the statute reads that "articles of incorporation
shall be executed stating name, purpose, place'of business, term,"
nmnber of directors, names of those for first year, amount of capital stock, and number of shares, and shall be filed in the office of
the secretary of state, and thereupon the -signers shall be a corporation," at least four different views are taken: (i) Corporate life
tar all purposes begins immediately on filing the articles, ipso facto
ev instanti,.without reference to any stock subscription or organization.10 ' (2) There is no corporate life until corporate organization,
0
by election or-appointment of officers.' 0 (3) There is only a quajifled corporate existence resulting from filing articles'and adult cor1
porate liie only after the requisite stock is subscribed and paid in. "
(4)Corporate life begins on the filing, but the incorporators whether
subscribing for stock or not, are tenants in common of the proposed
amount until it is duly subscribed by others."
-

Creation of Express Tr uts.
Upon the other hand the creation of an express trust is a matter
of the mere declaration of the trustor or declarant, accepted by the
05
trustee, or of a contract between them. There are no special statutes to comply with except the Statute of Frauds, the Statute of
Uses, statutes relating to Perpetuities, and to Conveyancing and Recording.
fThese will be considered in other connections. -At this point it is
only-necessary to say that for the most part these are easily-complied with. The Express Trust is a matter of a declaration of an
owner or of an agreement between parties under their common law
rights and can be moulded to suit the needs and wishes of the parties, and it can be made as certain, definite and clear as the skill of*.
the draftsman will permit. in expressing the intentions of the parfies,'"-and it will at least tot be defeated by incorreet guesses at
the mi-wning of uncertain, if not inconsistent, provision of written
law. The balance here certainly is in favor of the trust.
& D9k. p, E2 N. W. 9, z Wflt, Css s1.
Mfz Co. v. Pe&k-(Sg6), pS.
m3Iizn
, x"Wlm, Cases. SwWaltea'v. Over (sip). 49 Kas. toy, a Am. St. R.
(9144), 24 U. S. AP. 3S, z Wts.
30 Weebsedbg v. PUr CkY WAtb'i "
Cses, 574.
'"Havesv. Azsgoaon Petalem Co. (1S), 02 Mam. 38S.z WgSS , Ca" 58t.
, pp. S-A
2031t81d,
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Steps in .Creationof Corporatiiu.
Mir. FROST enumerates'" the various steps necessary to create a
corporation under modern busifiess .corporation act!, as.follows.:

(I) The drafting of the articles of incorporation;
(2) The signing-of the articles by the requisite number of incorporators, and the acknowledgement of the same before -an officer
duly authorized to take such acknowledgements;
(3) Filing and recording the articles with the proper state and
county officials after payment of the requisite organization la and
filing and recording fees;
(4) Organization of the corporation ready for the transaction
of business;
(5) Securing the necessary permit from state officials (if any
is required), to transact business in the domiciliary state.
Steps in Creation of Trust.
On the other hand a recent case has said the requisites of a valid
trust are: "(z) A designated beneficiary; (;) a designated tustee,
who must not be the beneficiary; (3)a fund-or other property sufficiently designated or identified to enable title thereto to pass to the
trustee; and (4)the actual delivery of the fund or other property,
or of a legal assignment thereof to the trustee, with the intention of
passing legal title ,thereto to him as.trustee.""
Let us considef these things a little more fully in reference to the
creation of Corporations and of Trusts.
The IncorporationPaper.
Under all general incorporation laws, some kind of a document
must be executed in a particular way, and filed, deposited, or recorded, in a specific way. The name of this document is various,-"deed.
of settlement," "articles of association," "articles of incorporation,"
"articles," "certifi~te of incorporation," "charter," "memorandum
of association,"--all of .which Mr. MAcHx considers objectionable,
and suggests that "incorporation paper" be used, although as he
says, that "term does not seem to have -been used in any state or
country."'" It seems however that it is not fatal to call it Articles
of Association when it ought to be called "Charter."1 1 '.

Frost, Inc. and Org. Corp., p. ss (4th EdA).
=Brown v. Spohr, z8o N. Y. sox, za 7s N. . 4",z6; Central Trust Co. v.
Gaffney, ;42 N. Y. S. 901, 9os, zs7 App. D. Soz. Kemmerer v. Kemmerer (igoS),
3S.
IlL 327, sa2 Am. 'St. R. z6g, 84 N. E. as6; Ranney v. Byers (9o4), .=g Pa. 3, 223
Am. St. R. 66o, 68 AtL 97t.
u Macben, Corporat1o0UJ p. o, 5 S.

mIaser v. swrcnae Sav. Bk. (88),

s6 is.ro4,

s Wasus, Ca

67 on"6o8.
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In any event there must be a written or printed incorporation
paper.11 The drafting of this document, under printed forms, that
are usually furnished upon application seems to be a simple matter,
and is often dohe without much professional consideration. However since the document, will constitute, together with the law under
which it is executed, a contract of a dual nature,-one between the
corporation and the state, and another among the shareholders themselves,21 - to be construed "rigidly in favor of the public And against
the corporation ;'""* and since the express powers of a corporation
are such as are found expressed in the statute under which the corporation is to be formed, or such, as though not so expressed, may
be lawfully claimed, if specified in the incorporation paper,1 1though
not otherwise, much skill is required to get the best results ' Mr.
FROST enumerates 28 different classes of express powers, 21 of which
are expressed in most general laws, but 7 of which if desired, must
usually be claimed in the incorporation paper, if they can be had at
all ;15 and, although formerly it was held that one state could not
spawn its corporate progeny to do business in another state, yet that
view has been abandoned so completely that the states have become
unseemly competitors in vending their corporate wares, to such an
extent that every important business seeking incorporation asks
where can the incorporation be had with a maximum of power, and
a minimum of inconvenience; so where to incorporate has become
a question of extreme importance, and can be answered.only partially by any lawyer after careful investigation and comparison of
statutes. Mr. FROST suggests 21 questions to be answered in this
connection, and these certainly do not cover more than half the
ground; all these considerations make it certain that the proper
drafting of important incorporation papers requires a high degree of
skill and experienceYu
The incorporation paper must be executed as the statute provides,
and there are many pitfalls here also. If the statute says that "any
number" may form a corporation, by signing articles of association,.
and stating, among other -things, the "names and residence" of the
signers, and there are 27 signers, but only two state their residences,
11T
so too if the
the corporation in Indiana, at least, is not de jure
muUtley v. Union Tool Co. (188), Ist Gray (Mass.), 13, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 597.
Machen, Corporations,' p. 32'33; Wilgus, Corp. Cases, p. 707 Ct seq.
Oregon Ry. Co. v. Oregonian Co. (S888), 130 U. S. 2, 1 Wilgus- Cases, p. 429.
214 Machen, Corporatios If 4863, 64-2os.
SFrost, Inc. & Org. of Corporations, 4th P., It 27, 28, pp. 34-36.
3"Ib. 1 28. p. 35. WIlgus, Corporaions, 1 49.
31 Busenback v. Attica &c. Road Co. (873), 43 Ind. a6ft z Wilgus, Cases, p. 6oo.
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residence of directors is. omitted when the statute requires it; so
where the "principal place of business" is to be stated, it won't do
to say "the operations of the company are to be-carried on""16 in a
certain county; and in Maryland it seems that even a church, though
it has been running as.an incorporated body for years, taking a deed
for its property, giving a mortgage upon it, issuingbonds, etc., cannot be l ild liable fbr its just debts, if its articles were acknowledged
before only one justice of the peace, when two were required.11s And
in Wisconsin, where the statute requires the certificate of organization.to be filed with the register of deeds,--and where the original
certificate of organization was left 'with the recorder, long enough
to be recorded in his office, and was so recorded by copying in the
record books, and was then -returned to the supposed corporation,
instead of being left on file in the recorder's office, there was neither
a corporation de jure nor de facto u
Then too the incorporation fee, varying from a few dollars in
some states to a large sum in others must be paid, or there is, at least,
in Colorado, neither a corporation de jure,de facto nor by estoppel.112

In Arizona it would have cost $45 to incorporate the United States
Steel Corporation; it cbst $22oooo in New Jersey; and it would have
cost in Pennsylvania, $3;666,666.a

I have already spoken sufficiently of the variety of view, and conflict of authority as to when the corporate organization is complete.
and real corporate birth occurs. Under the statutes of many states
certain things must be done before the corporation can "commence
business," and there his been much difficulty to determine the result
of a failure to do all these- things. Perhaps it i's reasonably safe to
say that if the duty to do these things before commencing business
is placed by the statute upon those seeking incorporation, such will
be a mandatory condition precedent to valid corporate existence;
whereas if the duty seems to be rather upon the corporation, instead
of those seeking incorporation, it will be a condition subsequent; but
in either case the state can bring quo warranto, in the one case
against the unsuccessful incgrporators, in the other against the defaulting corporation, disaster being possible in either case."'
2n Harris & Stickle v. McGregor (t86S). 29 Cal. Z24, 1 Wilgus, Cases. p. 6o.
Boyce Y. Trustees &c. (1876), 46 Md. 3S9, z Wilgus, Cases, p. 642.
Bergeron v. Hobbs (1897), 96 Wis. 641, 6S Am. St. R. 8S, z Wilgus, Cases, 6Z.
InJones v. Aspen Hardware Co. (189S). 21 Colo. 263, 52 Am. St. R. 220, 1 Wilgus,

Case, 637.
Frost, Inc. & Org. Corp., 4th ed, Table ill.
222Mokelumne Hill Mining Co. v. Woodbury (18S9). 14 Cal. 424, 73 Am. D658,
z Wilgus, Cases a96; Harrod v. Hamer, (2873), 32 Wis. x62, z Wilgus, Cases, S6.
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Trust Instrument.
Now let us see how it stands with an Express Trust. MAITLAND
says: "In the old days no deed, no writing was necessary to create
a use, trust or confidence. I enfeoff you, and by word of mouth I
declare that you are to hold to the use of X. You must hold to the
.use of X. As to trusts this stillis law, except in so far as it has been
altered by the Statute of Frauds."""
The Statute of Frads of 1677, provided (§ 7) that "All declarations of or creationg of trusts or confidences of any lands, tenements
or hereditaments shall be manifested and proved by some writing
signed by the party who is by law enabled to declare such trust, or
by his last will in writing, or else they shall be utterly void and of no
effect," but by section 8, this was not to apply where the trust results
12
"by the implication or construction of law." '
It is to be noted here that this statute applies only io-realpropert,
and not personal property ;126 that writing only, isot a deed, no sealed
instrument, no witness, no acknowledgement is necessary; and further no writing is necessary to create the trust, but only to manifest
and prove it "The statute will be satisfied if the trust can be manifested and proved by any subsequent acknowledgement by the trustee, as by an express declaration by him or by a memorandum to that
effect, or by a letter under his hand, or by a recital in a deed executed by him; and the trust, however late the proof, operates retrospectively from the time of its creation."m But Courts of Equity
went further and held "the Statute of Frauds does not prevent the
proof of fraud," and "it is a fraud for a person who knows land has
been conveyed to him in trust, to deny the trust-and claim the land
himself.' 128
In a few states this section of the Statute of Frauds is not in force,
and in a few, a deed instead of merely a writingis required, but in
1
most states the statute is in force with the effect above given. '
As noted it does not apply to personal property, 5nor does it require
a contract or consideration to make one a trustee"
The 9th section of this statute however required that every grant
or assignment of a trust,that is thebeneficial interest, "be in writing,"
m'Maltlind, Equity, p. 5?..

M=9 Chs 11, c. 3. Maitland's Equity, p. S7; Raiey V. Byers, (zgo), si9 Pa.
33s, 123 Am. St. R. 66, 68 AtL 971; Ames, Cases, 1 8, pp. 76-189.

'-Maitland.

Equity, pp. S-5g.

2" Lewin. Trusts, 11th Ed., p. s6; Maitland, Equity, p. S8.
* Maitland, Equity. S9; Rochefoucald v. Bonste&ad (1897), z Ch.
Cook, Trusts & Tusttees, 1 S; Ames, Cases. pp. 176-77.
"Mitlnd, Equity, p. S3; Cook, Trusts & Trustees, it 4547.
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and not merely manifested.or proved by a writing.2
So too the
13th Elizabeth forbidding all conveyances to delay, hinder or defraud, creditors; and the 27th Elizabeth forbidding voluntary conveyances to defraud and deceive subsequent purchasers, of course,
apply to conveyances in trust as well as to other conveyances. These
are generally in force in this country..

To quote MArLAND again: "The creation of a trust may be a
perfectly unilateral act, there may not be more than one party to it.
* * * I declare myself a trustee of this watch for my son who is in
India. If I afterwards sell that watch, although my son has never
heard of the benefit that I had intended for him, I commit a breach
of trust and nzy son has an equitable cause of action against me." 3
While it is usually said that "no one can be compelled to undertake
a trust," yet because courts of Equity have been so jealous of its
pet, MAITLAND points out "In practice it would not. be very sage to
rely upon this doctrine, for one may very easily do something or
say something that can be regarded as an acceptance of the trust"
with all its attendant duties, that cannot be easily got rid of. "There-fore if you hear that ahyone has been conveying property to you as
a trustee, and you do not wish to be burdened with a trustee's duties,
you will be wise in repudiating in some emphatic manner the rights
and the duties which were to have been thrust upon you." 1 "
No specific words are necessary. "The words 'use' and 'trust' are
not sacramental terms." In fact "the most untechnical words," mere
precatory words, such as "desire," "will," "request," "entreat," "beseech," "recommend," "hope," "do not doubt," have been held sufficient in wills; all that is.
required is'a reasonably clear expression
of the declarant.1"
Th Statte of Uses, 27 Henry VIII, 1535, provided that the legal
estate should follow the use, so that the beneficiary should thereafter
become the legal owner. It read that wherever one person "was
seized of land to the use of another" in fee simple, or. fee tal, or
for life, or for years, the latter shall be deemed to be in lawful,
seizin, estate, and possession, of such land in such like estate as he
had in the use.
It is to be noted (i) The Statute does not apply

to chattels personaL (2) Nor does it apply to leaseholds for years,
that is where the estate in the trustee is for years, since seizin applied

m -itlada's Equty. p. 51.
* 'Bkfs
m, .qukty, II 241, St.
Maitland, qfty, . Mss"
-Mtau.Equity. M 5SE.
20Maitdnd, Equity, m 36, 66; Kemmeme v. Kem m (tS4), z
A.. StL R. t69, 84 N. E. as6; Ames, Cases pp. 77-to7; Xeweso
Ce
3"iaiand, Equity. S; Keaneson. Cems, 34-V-
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only to freeholds; but on the other hand if land is conveyed to A and
his heirs to hold to the use of B for x,ooo years, this use is executed
and B becomes the legal owner, not of the fee, but of the term of
years; but if B assigns it to X to the use of Y, the latter will have
only an Equitable estate. (3) Again the Statute does not apply where
there is an active trust. "I convey land unto A and his heirs, to the
use that they shall sell the land and divide the proceeds among my
children, or upon trust that they shall so sell and divide. The Statute has nothing to say to this case. You do not find one person seized
in trust for another person, you find A seized upon trust to make a
sale." The test seems to be, does the instrument merely tell A that
B is to have the enjoyment or does it impose upon A some special
duty in regard to the property as to manage and control it, and collect and pay the profits to the beneficiary?; if the latter the trust is
active, not passive, and the Statute of Uses does not thrust .the leg
title on the beneficiary. (4) Finally after Tyrrells Case in 1557, 't
was held that the Statute exhausted itself in executing the first use,
and so, in the case of a use upon a use, it did not execute the second
use.23" This however is a matter that- applies to conveyancing.
Again no filing or recording of the trust instrument is necessary
or those who know
to make the trust valid, at least as to the parties
or ought to know of its existence or terms.1 8
The trust deed in the Sugar Trust case provided that "The custody of the deed was to be in the president of the board, with sole
and independent control, and not to be shown* to any corporation,
firm or person whatsoever except y express direction of the
board."1" If it is required to be put in the form of a deed, as in
some states, then, of course, it must conform to the statutes relating
thereto, and those relating to registration and recording such deeds,
in order to furnish constructive notice. But these rules are simple,
definite and certain, and easily complied with.140 Unless the trust is
to do business in an artificial name, or as a partnership, and there are
statutes requiring registration, there are no other statutes except in a
few states, affecting the creation of trusts, except those relating to
perpetuities. These will be referred to in other connections..
Again no fees are to be paid to the state, or other officers, except
recording fees when the instrument is a deed of conveyance. Of
course if the legal estate in land is conveyed in trust, the rules relating to the conveyance of the legal title to the trustee, apply just the
33 Maitland, Equity, 3S-38; Tyrrell's Case, 2 Dyer, zssa, pl. .o,Kenneson, Cases, 37.
_n Carson v. Phelps, (2873), 40 Md. 73.
2

0 People v. North River Sugar Ref. Co., (i8go), i2t N. Y. s82, x8 Am. St. R. 843,
2 Wilgus, Cases. zoo.
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party. And
same as they apply to a conveyance of land to any other
particular
any
of
transfer
the
to
apply
rules
in general whatever
is to be
such
when
apply
will
kind of 'property, to another person,
1 41 And a promise to create a volunconveyed to a trustee in trust.
discussing
tary trust will not be enforced. The rules we have been

apply only to the creation of the trust estate itself. so far as formalIt seems here again that the balance of simplicity

ities of creation are concerned is in favor of the trust..
H. L. WwuS
Unitersity of Michigan.

(To be continued.)

1'*1Ti..,"

CORPORATIONS AND EXPRESS TRUSTS AS
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS.*
Ii.
Parties to Be Incorporated:
Coke's second requisite of corporate existence was parties to incorporate, and he indicated that these might be either natural or artificial. It seems now that the latter, i. e. corporations cannot, unless
authorized expressly or by necessary implication be either an incorporator or member of another corporation.' 4 1 General incorporation laws contemplate incorporators and members. The former
are persons, in the case of business corporations, whose function it

is to bring the corporation into existence under the statute; they
may or may not themselves become members by taking stock. When
the corporation is organized, their functions, as incorporators,
cease.' 42 On the other hand the members are those who become
such by ownership of stock, and in the beginning, this ownership is
acquired through a subscription. If this is made after the corporation is created, and capable of contracting, the ordinary rules of contract may apply.

14 "

In most cases, however, there can be no corporation until members are secured, and this must be either before or contemporaneously with the coming into existence of the corporation. This situation has puzzled the courts exceedingly. There are numerous
views; (I) Such a preliminary agreement has no force and effect,
unless it strictly conforms to the statute, as signing and acknowledging the incorporation paper ;144 (2) That it is a valid contract from
the time the requisite amount is subscribed, from which a party cannot thereafter withdraw and which is enforceable against the estate
of one who dies before the corporation comes into existence and
accepts it;145 (3) That such a preliminary subscription is a mere
withdrawable offer, revocable by death or insanity, at any time before the corporation comes into existence and accepts it expressly or
* Continued from December issue.
14a Denny Hotel Co. v. Schram (1893) 6 Wash. 134, 36 Am. St. R. 130, 1 Wilgus,
Cases, 553. Note, Ib., p. 889.
142Nickum v. Burkhardtt, (1S97) 3o Ore. 464, 6o Am. St. R. 822, 1 Vilgus, Cases, 39r.
211 Southwestern State Co. v. Stephens (igog)
X39 Wis. 6x6, 231 Am. St. R. 1074,
29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 92, 120 N. 'W. 408.
2 Sedalia, Warsaw etc. Co. v. Wilkerson, (1884) 83 Mo. 235, x Wilgus, Cases, 459;
Coppage v. Hutton (s8go) 124 Ind 401, 7 L. R. A. 591, 1Vilgus, Cases, 469.
2' Tonica & Petersburg R. R. Co. v. McNeeley (x859) 22 Ill. 71, 1 Wilgus, Cases,
49r-
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impliedly ;140 (4) That such a subscription is a mere withdrawable
offer to the future corporation, but a contract among the subscribers. 14 Where the courts have not already passed on it, it is impossible to tell which view they wil! take. Of course if all goes well,
and the corporation is duly formed and accepts the subscriptions
made, they will be binding, but until that time there is always great
uncertainty from the possibility of death or withdrawal of a subscriber. The difficulty of the courts is that "it takes two to make
a contract," and, since the corporation cannot be bound until it comes
into existence and has proper officers to bind it, the other party
cannot be bound. To get around this view subscriptions are sometimes made with a tn'stee for the unborn corporation, which a court
enforce in its favor whenever thz corporation comes
of equity will 148
into existence.

Parties to a Trust:

This again shows the simpler theory that underlies the trust. If
A gives money or other property to B, in trust for C, or even if
A declares that he holds money or other property in trust for C,C whether in existence at the time or not, whenever he comes into
existence, at least if within the rule relating to perpetuities, can
enforce the trust in equity. In other words only one party or person
is necessary to declare a trust; all the trustee has to do is to accept
it expressly or impliedly, and the beneficiary does not have to do
that. All that is required is for the settlor to express an intent to
create a trust, and designate some one a trustee, and some one a
beneficiary.148

Of course this declaration of trust must be distinguished from a
gift. If I write a letter to my son saying "I give you my Blackacre
estate, my lease-hold house in the High Street, the sum of £IOOO.
Consols standing in my name, the wine in my cellar," this does not
create a trust, nor does it make a valid gift for a letter will not oo to
make such conveyances; even if I execute a deed covenanting to
convey and assign these things, there is not yet a trust nor a perfect
gift, and the reason is "I make it clear I do not intend to make my146Bryant's Pond Steam Min1 Co. v. Felt (1895) 87 Me. 234, 47 Am. St. R. 323, 1
Wilgus, Cases 474.
Minneapolis Threshing Machine Co. v. Davis, 40 Minn. iio, 12 Am. St. R. 701,
14"
3 L. R. A. 796, 41 N. ,V.io26, i Wilgus, Cases, 492. Nebraska Chickory Co. v. Lednicky, (1907) 79 Neb. 587, 113 N. W. 245.
4
2 sSan Joaquin Land Co. v. West (1892) 94 Cal. 399, 29 Pac. 785, 1 Wilgus, Cases
497; West v. Crawford (1889) 8o Cal. xg, x Wilgus, Cases Soo.
Kenneson's Cases, p. 89, 28 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of
""Ames, Cases, note p. 2z;
Law, p. ioo.
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self a trustee, I mean to give" instead, and an intention to give, without delivering the gift is not a gift. "The two intentions are very
is
different, the giver means to get rid of his rights, the man who
but
rights
his
retain
to
intending to make himself a trustee intends
to come under an onerous obligation." "An imperfect gift is no
150
declaration of trust."' ,
"Every person who can hold and dispose of any legal or equitrespect of
able estate or interest in property, may create a trust in
such estate or interest,"-the state, a private corporation, married
women, an infant at least till he avoids it, and aliens and non-resiFeddents. 151 Still further it is the constitutional right under the
of
citizen
a
constitute
to
state
eral constitution of a citizen of one
personal,
or
real
property
another state a trustee of his
wherever the property is located. 52The Indiana statute forbidding
this was declared unconstitutional.3
So too any kind of property may be held in trust; real, personal,
relegal, equitable, in possession or in action, (if assignable), in
the
be
can
foreign,
or
domestic
expectancy,
mainder, reversion, or
5
subject of a declaration of trust, subject to the rules above given.'
Any one capable of holding property, may be a trustee, an infant,
married women, corporation, or alien, or even a person of unsound
of
mind. And in the case of an infant or lunatic, trustee, a court
the
out
equity can vest the title in some suitable person to carry
trust. One of several beneficiaries may be a trustee if the settlor
so appoints. 54
So too any one can be a beneficiary,-infants, married women,
corporations, unincorporated bodies, residents or non-residents,
no
any one capable of taking and holding any55kind of property and
acceptance by the beneficiary is necessary.
The other three requisites of corporate existence named by Lord
Coke,--name, place, and proper words, along with some others are
This
provided for under general laws in the Incorporation Paper.
(4)
purpose,
the
(3)
place,
the
(2)
usually requires (I) the name,
duration
the
(6)
and
directors,
of
number
the
(5)
the capital stock,
, Maitland, equity, pp. 73, 74.
ua 27 Am. & Eng. Encyc., ist Ed. 13.

Co. v. Chicago etc.
Sears, Trust Estates etc., p. 194; Farmers' Loan & Trust
2o N. E. 1093.
342,
Ind.
131
(x8ps)
Smith
v.
Roby
146;
Rep.
Fed.
27
(1886)
Co.
Ry.
Note, Ames, Cases, p. x93.
'5 27 Am. & Eng. Encyc. ist 3d. 24, 25.
Trusts & Trustees, §§ xio-ix8.
4 27 Am. & 1ng. Encyc. ist Ed. x6, x7; Cook,
Cases, pp. 215-231; Kenneson, Cases,
27 Am. & 1sng. Encyc. ist Ed. 23; Ames,
Connecticut Riv. Say. Bank v. Albee
90-97; Loring, Trustees Handbook, p. '5 (3d Ed.);
__

(892)

64 Vt. 571, 33 Am. St. R. 944.
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to be stated." ' The purpose of course of this Incorporation Paper
is to give definite form to a particular corporation,-to make specific for a single corporation what is general and applicable to all
corporations of that class.
Although as we have seen no formal instrument is necessary to
the creation of a valid trust, yet in the cast of an express trust for
business a deed or declaration of trust is drawn up: (I) Providing
for a name; (2) Designating trustees, and providing for their succession; (3) Providing for the raising and conveying the trust res
or fund to the trustees, and defining their rights, powers and duties
in reference thereto: (4) Providing for the issue of transferable
certificates to those who are the cestuis que trust, in proportion to
their respective beneficial interests in the property and profits; (5)
Providing for division of profits; (6) Limiting liability of trustees
and providing for dissoand beneficiaries; (7)Fixing the duration,
15 7
lution at the termination of the trust.
These are so similar to the requirements of the incorporation
paper that they may be taken up in order and compared with some
detail.
Corporate Name:
It was long ago said that the corporate name is a baptismal one,
and of the very being of the corporate constitution. It is now
universally required to be stated in the incorporation paper, although
it perhaps could be acquired under the common law by user. When
rightfully acquired the corporation is considered as having a franchise therein, with the same exclusive right to its use in the incorporating state that it would have in a trade mark, including the
right to enjoin its use by another domestic corporation. In several
states particular provisions exist in relation to the selection and
publication of the corporate name that must be strictly complied
name without auwith. It has been held that a change of corporate
158
thority, makes the members liable as partners.
Trust Name:
In the absence of a statute forbidding, a natural person may do
business in his own name or in any name he pleases to assume as a
business name, so long as it does not infringe another's right in a
20 1 Wilgus, Cases, PP. 435-440.
UT

Conyngton, Corporate Organization, p. 366.
z Wilgus, Cases, pp. 8x6-829.
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name already in use by the latter. ' Since the trustees are natural
persons, they may choose such name in which to carry on business
if they so desire, or the name may be, probably should be and usually
is designated in the deed of trust, as for example, a trust deed in
which Richard Olney, Mkloorefield Storey and William F. Beal are
trustees (and therefore likely to have been drawn with the utmost
legal skill) provides: "49. The trusts of these presents may be collectively designated for all purposes thereof as the Old South Building Trust, and the Trustees may for the like purposes be referred to
as the Trustees of the Old South Building Trust."l""
Another signed by similarly distinguished lawyers, provides;
"First. The trustees, in their collective capacity, shall be designated,
so far as practicable, as the "Massachusetts Electric Companies,"
and under that name shall, so far as practicable, conduct all business
and execute all instruments in writing, in performance of their
trust." 0 '
Some states have statutes, as has Michigan, providing that "No
person or persons shall hereafter carry on or conduct or transact
business in this state under any assumed name, or under any designation, name, or style, corporate or otherwise, other than the real
name or names of the individual or individuals owning, conducting,
or transacting, such business, unless such persons shall file in the
office of the clerk of the cofunty or counties in which such person
or persons own, conduct, or transact or intend to own, conduct or
transact such business, or maintain an office or place of business, a
certificate setting forth the name or names under which such business owned is, or is to be conducted, or transacted and the true or
real full name or names of the person or persons owning, conducting or transacting the same, with the home and post office address
2
' ' G
under specified penalty
or addresses of said person or persons,
for failure. By a later provision this was specifically extended to
partnerships, and no change in name shall be made until a new cerold members remaining
tificate shall be filed giving the facts,10 the
3
liable until this new certificate is filed.
This of course would apply to trustees carrying on business under
an artificial name. And presumably, also, if the trust is so organized
152Sparks v. Dispatch Transfer Co. (1891) 104 MO. 53X, 24 Am. St. R. 35Y. Note,
Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Cummings, - Ore. -, t33 Pac.
132 Am. St. R. si7.
xz69, 47 L. R. A. N. S. 252.
15 Conyngton, Corporate Organization, Form 6z.
10I Scars, Trust Estates, etc., p. 287.
22 Public Acts, Mich. 1907, No. 1o, p. 119.
21

Public Acts, Mich. 1913, No. 164, p. 286.
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to
as to make the beneficiaries partners, all their names would have
stateSuch
avoided.
be
can
and
be given. This however should
corments as the above are generally required in annual reports of
are.
they
than
onerous
more
not
are
and
porations,
Corporate Domicile:
I have already referred to the uncertainty of the statutory provisstations relating to place or location. Where the New Hampshire
"place
the
state
should
paper
ute provided that the incorporation
by
in which its business is to be carried on," and the paper drawn
business
a supposedly competent attorney, stated "the places of
were Nashua in New Hampshire, and East Brookfield, in Massachusetts," and the manufacturing business was done at East Brookfield, and the corporate meetings held at Nashua, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, held there was no corporation de jwre,
was individually liable
de facto, or by estoppel, and the treasurer
1 4 So too corporations are
on a note given as the corporation's note.
in
frequently dissolved for failure to maintain a domiciliary office
It
not.
or
requires
so
statute
the
the incorporating state, whether
not
could
meetings
stockholders'
corporate
was formerly held that
lawfully be held outside of the creating state because in the very
nature of things the incorporating statute conferring such a privilege
or franchise, is necessarily inoperative beyond such state, and outof only
side of such state the assembled stockholders are possessed
16
their natural powers. 1 This doctrine is gradually passing away,
with proand in the absence of statutory provisions controlling, and
reasnow
is
it
authorizing,
so
visions in the incorporation paper
creating
the
outside
meetings
onably safe to hold shareholders
statustate. 167 However there are so many conflicting decisions and 1 68
done
be
to
such
advise
to
wise
never
tory provisions that it is
Trust Domicile:
special
Upon the other hand since Trustees act not under any
law
common
privilege or franchise from the state, but under their
there
business
do
to
and constitutional right as citizens of one state
. 342, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 594v. Forbes, (1889) 148 Mass. 249, x9 N.
6s (4th ].d.).
10 Frost, Incorporation and Org. of Corp., pp. 64,
61g, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 841.
' Miller v. Ewer (1847) 27 Me. 509, 46 Am. Dec.
114 Mo. 218, 35 Am. St. R. 746, x
'l Missouri Lead etc. Co. v. Reinhard (1893)
(x886) xx8 U. S. x6x, I Wilgus, Cases,
Wilgus, Cases, 844; Graham v. Boston etc. R. R.
S16Montgomery

846, note p. 847.
20 Machen, Corp. 9 1212.
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or in another, there is no difficulty as to "place of business," and no
place of business is usually stated, further than to designate the city
in which annual or other meetings are to be held. Here again the
Trust is simpler. 09
Corporate Purposes:
Incorporation statutes frequently provide for incorporation "for
any lawful purpose" with certain exceptions, usually of a public
service character. There is frequent difficulty in determining whether two or more purposes can be joined in one incorporation paper;
the statutes in some states expressly authorize this; in some states
the state officials so construe their ambiguous statutes; in others the
statutes divide business into classes, which cannot be joined; in still
other states, only one purpose or general- object can be claimed;
while in still others, the name of the corporation must indicate the
various purposes. This serves to indicate the confusion, and the
70
difficulty encountered hereY. This is mitigated however somewhat
by the rule that things that cannot be properly claimed are mere
surplusage, and can be rejected. This however would not help
out an incorporation paper where two objects are joined when only
one is permitted, but either of which would be valid if standing
alone. Perhaps the corporation would be permitted to elect, and
amend the paper, and thereafter carry on the one line of business
elected. In any event the "object" clauses of an important corporation paper requires special skill and care in drawing.
Trust Purposes:
There seems to be no such difficulty, or in fact no such limitations,
applying to Trusts. They can be created to carry on any lawful
business or businesses desired, one or many as the parties, the declarants and the trustees provide for, unless there are express statutory
limitations. They have been created for manufacturing, mining,
lumbering, agriculture, transportation, mercantile, real estate, hold1
ing shares, disposing of patents, and numerous other purposes.
And as we saw above "Every kind of valuable property, both real
and personal, that can be assigned at law may be the subject-matter
of a Trust. 7

2

Here again with equal attention the purposes for

which a Trust may be formed may be more certainly provided for
than in similar incorporation papers.
16 See Forms, given in Sears, Cook (Corp.) and Conyngton (Corp. Organization).
Frost, Incorp. and Organ. Corps., p. x9 et seq.; Machen, Corps., 19 46-1o8.
Trust Estates etc., p. 253.
172Perry, Trusts, 6th Ed., § 67.
17

571 Sears,
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For instance in the Massachusetts Gas Companies, the declaration of trust authorized its trustees to engage: (i) in manufacturing,
buying, selling and dealing in coal, oil, coke, gas and all products
thereof: (2) in manufacturing and supplying gas or electricity or
any other agent for light, heat, power or other purposes; (3) in acquiring, owning, managing, exchanging, selling and dealing in the
stocks, shares and securities of corporations, trusts or associations,
engaged in whole or in part in any business above mentioned, or
in owning and operating railways or railroads or transporting passengers, merchandise, mails or express matter, or in manufacturing,
selling or repairing machines, equipments supplies or other articles
used by corporations. trusts or associations of any of the classes
above mentioned. * * * * (4) in any business similar in character to

that above mentioned which the trustees may deem expedient," and
to acquire, hold and dispose of the stocks of such institutions.''
Corporate Stock:
The theory of the capital stock of a corporation is that the power
to have such, or increase or decrease it, is a corporate franchise,
and must be expressly conferred by the state, or otherwise it does not
exist. 1 74 Incorporation statutes frequently fix maximum and mini-

mum limits, and sometimes limit indebtedness to the amount of capital stock, also special provisions are almost always made in reference
to increase or decrease of the same, otherwise unanimous consent
of shareholders, as well as the consent of the state would be necessary.' - ' Under all the incorporation laws, the incorporation paper
must state the number of shares, and the par value thereof (except
now in New York) and these cannot be changed except by an
amendment made to the articles of incorporation. In the absence
of statutory provisions preventing, in the original organization of
the company, preferred and common stock may be provided for in
the incorporation paper, but not so afterward except by uanimous
consent, unless there are statutory provisions making other regulations.17 1 In several states as in Michigan the statutes provide for
a certain kind of redeemable preferred stock with a limited dividend;
in such states other kinds of preferred stock, or with greater dividends cannot be provided for. In some states the statute, because
Sears, Trust Estates, p. 303.
' Cooke v. Marshall (1899) 191 Pa. St. 315, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 761.
l
-3Railway Co. v. Allerton (1873) 85 U. S. (18 Wall.) 233, 2 Wi gus, Cases, 442,
note 763.
20 Rent v. Quicksilver Mining Co. (879) 78 N. Y. x59, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 790, note
793; Campbell v. Zylonite Co. izs N. Y. 455.
173
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the common law was otherwise, expressly provides "that each shareholder shall be entitled to one vote for each share held." In such
a state can non-voting preferred shares be created? This is answer77
In some states there is
ed differently in different jurisdictions.1
a statutory liability attaching to the ownership of stock, and our
Supreme Court has just held that when a corporation organized in
one state having no such statutory liability, is expressly authorized
beto do business in a state having such liability the shareholders
8
makes
This
state."1
such
in
done
business
for
thereon
liable
come
stock holding in corporations organized to do business throughout
the United States a precarious matter.
Trust Stock:
How is it with Express Trusts? Can they be created with a capital stock represented by transferable shares? Or can -the property
held in trust by the trustees be represented by shares issued by the
trustees, transferable, so as to give purchasers the same rights as
original beneficiaries?
There is no doubt now, but that at Common Law, under merely
their power to contract, individuals may between themselves engage
in business together, each contributing property thereto, and take
certificates representing their interests, which they may if the agreement so provides transfer to others. For ioo years or so, 1720 to
1825, the English Bubble Act forbade this, but this was repealed in
England, and was never, or if at all, only to a very limited extent
country have held
in force in this country. The courts in this
179
and now hold, that
from the beginning that this could be done,
although by constitutional provisions "corporations can Be created
only under general laws" and corporation is defined in the constitution to "include all associations and joint stock companies having
any of the powers and privileges of corporations not possessed by
individuals or partnerships," and there is no statute authorizing the
creation of joint stock companies with transferable shares, still,
such institutions can be created by contract among individuals under
the exercise of their common law rights and not be corporations.
Such was the holding in a well considered Idaho case, following
many similar decisions in other states.'" There is therefore no law
against doing this. Still further we have already seen that the inetc. Co. v. Duns277 State v. Swanger, z9o Mo. 561, 89 S. W. 892; Colonist Printing
mui, 32 Can. Sup. Ct. 679.
I" Thomas v. Matthiessen (i953) 232 U. S. 221.
Sears, Trust Estates, §§ 52-54.
9 1 Wilgus, Cases, note p. 175.
m-o
Spottswood v. Morris (xgo6) 12 Id. 360, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 665, 85 Pac. to94.
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terest of a beneficiary is substantially a property right inheritable,
descendible, and transferable as other rights are. The 9th section
of the English Statute of Frauds required an assignment to be in
writing; and since the beneficiaries' rights are not those of joint or
co-tenants in the trust fund, but wholly incorporeal and intangible,
just what the trust declared provides, the most natural way to represent them is by a certificate, and the most natural and convenient
way of transfer is by an assignment of the certificate. In Estate of
Oliver, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, held that the interest of
the stockholder "was an interest in the profits made. He had no
title to the land bought by the trastees for the company, as a.tenant
in common or otherwise and could neither convey nor encumber it.
His interest in it was personal estate and the extent of that interest
was shown by his cerificate of stock."''
The following are illustrations of the stock provisions in a few
Trusts:"Central Massachusetts Light and Power Co. The beneficial interest in the trust created by its agreement and declaration of trust
is divided into 6,500 preferred shares- and 6,500 common shares.
The latter have no par value. The former have a par value of
$ioo, are entitled to cumulative preferred dividends of 5 per cent
the first year and increasing thereafter yearly to 6 per cent after
May 15, I 9 18. The preferred shares have a preference in liquidation and are entitled to $iiO if the trust is terminated within two
yearly up to $125 if the
years, and to amounts increasing thereafter
'1
termination occurs after May 15, I918. "'
The Worcester Railways and Investment Company issued "negotiable. certificates or evidences of interest for 6o,0o shares, each
share representing a fractional beneficial interest of i/6oooo in"
its property, the trustees having discretion to fix the dividends there83

on.1

The capital of the Massachusetts Light and Traction Companies,
is "divided into iooooo shares of the par value of $i.oo each,
bearing 5 per cent. non-cumulative dividends, to be designated as
"preferred A stock," 5o,ooo shares of the par value of $5.oo each,
bearing 6 per cent. non-cumulative dividends, to be designated "preferred B stock," 8 4and io,ooo shares of the par value of $25,ooo, of
common stock.'1

x89o) 136 Pa. 43, 2o Am. St. R. 894....
1788 House) of Special Commission, Mass., on Voluntary Associa-

""Oliver's Estate

182Report (No.
tions (xg3) P. 40.
1131b. p. 2o.

I lb. p. 44.
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It would seem again here that the Express Trust is much more
flexible than the usual corporation provisions are in reference to
shares, there being no state to interfere, or statute to follow, and the
whole matter can be moulded to suit the parties, and may be changed
in any way or at any time, in accordance with such provisions as may
be inserted in the trust agreement. The only point of difficulty here
is in reference to partnership liability, a matter which is considered
later on.
Corporate Directors:
Statutes usually require the number to be stated, and when once
fixed can be changed only by an amendment regularly adopted.
Statutes also usually require them to be shareholders to the extent
of a few shares. Being elected there is no power of removal, unless
expressly provided for in the statute, incorporation paper, or bylaws. By perhaps all business corporation statutes there must be
directors, and in them the ordinary powers of the corporation are
vested. 61 They however have no legal or equitable title to8 7the corTheir
porate property. They act only in duly called meetings.
functions are sui generis, and have been likened to those of agents,
trustees or mandatories of the corporation, but perhaps they are
strictly neither. 8 8 Directors, however, are not agents of the shareholders, and except in certain peculiar situations are not generally
85
Courts are not in
said to be in a position of trust toward them.
of directors,
required
accord upon the degree of care and diligence
that an
diligence
and
care
one line of authorities saying that the
required,
is
business,
own
his
of
ordinarily prudent man takes
while another line of authorities says, since they get no pay, no
80
greater care is required than that required of a gratuitous bailee.'
They have no authority to sell or dispose of the corporate capital or
property, except such as is properly done in the ordinary course of
business. For defaults of the directors affecting all the shareholders alike, they are primarily liable only to the corporation, and
Matter of Election of Directors, 63 N. 3. L. 168, 2 Wilgus, Cases, p. 17442s8Blood v. La Serena, i13 Cal 221 ; Metropolitan Elev. R. R. Co. v. Manhattan EL

"IIn the

Ry. Co. (1884) 11 Daly (N. Y.) 373, x Wilgus, Cases, 694, tfote 702.
6o, 1 Wilgus,
' Bank of Little Rock v. McCarthy (1892) 55 Ark. 473, 29 Am. St. R.

Cases, note 85o.
ssAllen v. Curtis (185y) 26 Conn. 456, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1727; Elis v. Ward (189o)

137 IIl. 509, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1729; Wallace v. Lincoln Say. Bank (x89x) 89 Tenn. 630,
24 Am. St. R. 625, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1731.
mSee "Purchase of Shares of Corporation by a Director from a Shareholder," by
H. L. Wilgus, 8 Mich. Law Rev. (Feby. igso) p. 267.
33 Am. St.
'5 ]North Hudson Building & Loan Assn. v. Childs (1892) 82 Wis. 460,
Wilgus, Cases, 1737. See also 2 Wilgus, Cases, pp. 1874-1888.
R. 57,
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only when they so control the corporation as to prevent it from
bringing a proper action to protect itself amounting to a substantial
breach of trust, can the shareholder bring a representative suit in
equity to prevent a failure of justice. Courts of equity have no
special jurisdiction over directors merely as such. It is only when
there is a breach of trust upon their part, that they can be called to
account in equity.191
Trustees of Trusts:
In case of the Trust, the Trustees stand, so far as control and
management are concerned, if the Trust agreement so provides, in
a position somewhat Analogous to that of directors in a corporation.
They, however, exercise control, because they are the owners of
the property, and not tne agents of the beneficiaries, or of any one
else. They act as owners, but as owners that are obliged to render
an account in equity not merely to all the beneficiaries as a whole,
but to each and every beneficiary; for the beneficiary's right is individual, and in personarn, and enforceable in equity primarily,
92
not secondarily, against the trustee.1
A trustee has whatever estate either legal or equitable is necessary for him fully to carry out the trust created but no further ;193
and (i) "A trustee is bound to do anything that he is expressly bidden to do by the instrument creating the trust. (2) A trustee may
safely do anything that he is expressly authorized .to do by that instrument, even loan or invest money without adequate security.
(3) A trustee is bound to refrain from doing anything that is expressly forbidden by that instrument. (4) Within these limits a
trustee must play the part of a prudent owner and a prudent man
of business," not as if he had himself alone to consider, but also
"for. the benefit of other people for whom he felt morally bound to
provide."' 9 '
Upon the other hand, however, just because the trustee is owner
of the property, if the trustee dies intestate his estate devolves upon
his heir or personal representative if he had a fee; so also he can
devise the estate, or convey it inter vivos;'1 5 in fact "At law the
trustee has all those powers of alienating inter vivos, mortgaging and
101
Dodge v. Woolsey (855) 59 U. S. (8 How.) 331, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 88; Hawes
v. Oakland (88)
1o4 U. S. 450, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 17z6.
92'Ames, Cases, pp. 235-278.
'1 Reichert v. Missouri & Ill. Co. (1907) 231 Ill. 238, 121 Am. St. R. 307, 83
N. . 166.
2%Maitland, Equity, p. 98; Cook, Trusts & Trustees, § 127; Whiteley v. Learoyd,
33 Ch. D. 3SS, 1a A. C. 722, 25 Eng. Rul. Cas..326.
1 Maitland, Equity, pp. 86-90.
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so forth that he would have were there no trust in existence," but
of course any heir, devisee, executor, administrator or party taking
with notice is bound by the trust. To prevent these results several
trustees are appointed to hold as joint-tenants, with its attendant
survivorship.Y",

Unlike directors the act of a majority of trustees does not bind the
minority, all must join in a conveyance, or in a receipt. They are
not at all agents for one another, nor can one shelter himself by
saying he was out voted, if he, nevertheless, acquiesced in the
action taken.10 7 Of course, however all of these matters can be
modified to suit the wishes of the settlor.
The following from the declaration of trust of the Massachusetts
Gas Companies,--a manufacturing trust,-indicates what may be
done :'98

"The trustees shall hold the legal title to all property at any time
belonging to this trust, and subject only to the specific limitations
herein contained, they shall have the absolute control of the conduct
of all business of the trust; and the following enumeration of specific duties and powers shall not be construed in anyway as a limitation upon the general powers intended to be conferred upon them.
"The Trustees shall have authority to adopt and use a common
seal; to make all such contracts as they may deem expedient in the
conduct of business of the trust; from time to .time to release, sell,
exchange, or otherwise dispose of, at public or private sale, any or
all of the trust property, whether real or personal, for such prices
either in cash or the stocks, shares, or securities of other corporations, trusts or associations and upon such terms as to credit or otherwise as they may deem expedient; to guarantee or assume the obligations of other corporations, trusts or associations and to enter
into such agreements by way of indemnity or otherwise as they may
deem expedient in connection with the acquisition of property from
the subscribers as hereinbefore provided or otherwise; to confer,
by why of substitution, such power and authority on the President,
Treasurer, Secretary, and Executive Committee, and other officers
and agents appointed by them, as they may deem expedient; to borrow money for the purposes of the trust and give the obligations of
the Trustees therefor; to loan any money from time to time in the
Maitland, Equity, p. 93.
114
231 Ill.238, 121 Am. St. R. 307, 83
10 Reichert v. Missouri etc. Coal Co. (1907)
N. E. z66; Mattison v. Mattison (rgog) 53 Ore. 254, ioo Pac. 4, 133 Am. St. R. 829;
Adams' Estate (igo8) 221 Pa. 77, 7o Atl. 438, 128 Am. St. R. 727, Estate of Fesmire, 134
Pa. St. 67, i9 Am. St. 676.
114Sears, Trust Estates etc., p. 303.
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hands of the Trustees, with or without security, on such terms as
they may deem Expedient ; to subscribe for, acquire, ou' n. sell or otherwise dispose of such real or personal property including the stocks,
shares, and securities of any other corporations, trusts, or associations, as they may deem expedient in connection with the purposes of
the trust; to vote in person or by proxy on all shares of stock at
any time held by them, and to collect and receive the income, interest,
and profits of any such stock or securities; to collect, sue for, receive, and receipt for all sums of money at any time becoming due
to said trust; to employ counsel and to begin, prosecute, defend, and
settle suits at law, in equity or otherwise, and to compromise or refer to arbitration any claims in favor of or against the trust; and in
general, to do all such matters and things as in their judgment will
promote or advance the business which they are authorized to carry
on, although such matters and things may be neither specifically
authorized nor incidental to any matters or things specifically authorized. In addition to the powers herein granted the Trustees shall
have all power with reference to the conduct of the business and
management of the property of the trust which are possessed by
directors of a manufacturing corporation under the laws of Massachusetts.
"So far as strangers to the trust are concerned a resolution of the
Trustees authorizing a particular act to be done shall be conclusive
evidence in favor of strangers that such act is within the power
of the Trustees; and no purchaser from the Trustees shall be
bound to see to the application of the purchase money or other consideration paid or delivered by or for said purchaser to or from the
Trustees.
"Stated meetings of the Trustees shall be held at least once a
month, and other meetings shall be held from time to time upon the
-call of the President or any three of the Trustees. A majority of
the Trustees shall constitute a quorum; and the concurrence of all
the Trustees shall not be necessary to the validity of any action
taken by them, but the decision expressed by a vote of a majority of
the Trustees present and voting at any meeting shall be conclusive."
Other provisions authorize the adoption of by-laws, election of
officers, and executive committee, and agents, accepting resignations,
removing officers, filling vacancies, keeping records, etc.
Also "The Trustees shall not be liable for any error of judgment
or for any loss arising out of any act or omission in the execution
of this trust, so long as they act in good faith, nor shall they be personally liable for the acts or omissions of each other, or for the acts
or omissions of any officer, agent, or servant elected or appointed by
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to
or acting for them; and they shall not be obliged to give any bond
secure the due performance of this trust by them.
"Any Trustee may acquire, own, and dispose of shares in this trust
to the same extent as if he were not a Trustee."
CorporateLife or Duration:
We have seen that corporations were often said to be immortal.
sucThis of course meant that there was continuous or perpetual
corporation
the
unless
time
cession for an indefinite and unlimited
law,-loss of all
was dissolved in some of the ways known to the
of franchises, or quo warmembers, act of Parliament, surrender
109
This is still the law, unless there
ranto for misuser or non-user.
but there
are constitutional or statutory provisions to the contrary,
from 20
usually
being
fixed
limit
are such in nearly ever state, the
stated
be
must
duration
proposed
the
cases
to 5o years, and in many
had
be
may
renewal
a
states
many
In
Paper.
in the Incorporation
dissolve
to
right
for a like period. With us the Legislature has no 20 0
However,
unless the power to do so is reserved to the State.
injuriousduty
of
violation
for
through quo warranto proceedings
of disjudgment
pronounce
may
courts
the
ly affecting the public,
20 1 During the whole of its prescribed life, the corporation
solution.
the
is said to have perpetual or continuous succession, and remains
membership.
in
same corporation regardless of any change
Trust Duration:
the
In this respect, because of the "rule against perpetuities,"
This
form.
Trust
the
than
simpler"
seems
corporate organization
and
rule in all its applications is exceedingly intricate and technical,
have
lawyers
best
the
by
frequently papers, especially wills, drawn
because
contained provisions that have been rendered ineffective
business
ordinary
an
of
matter
the
In
offending against the rule.
existence cantrust, however, khile perhaps a perpetual or immortal
many cases
in
or
as
long
as
is
that
not be acquired, an existence
be obtained.
much longer than the ordinary corporate life can
relating to the
one
branches,
two
have
to
seems
rule
The English
accumulations.
for
vesting of future estates, and the other to trusts
estate limited
contingent
future
"Every
(i)
stated:
be
These may
Cases, 830; Boston Glass Manufac'tState v. Payne (89s) 129 Mo. 468, 1 Wilgus, Dec. 292, x Wilgus, Cases, 866.
49, 3s Am.
tory v. Langdon (1834) 24 Pick. (Mass.)
4 Wheat. (U. S.) 518, 1
0 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819),
Wilgus, Cases, 708. ,
114, 2 Wilgus, Cases, x29&.
:People v. Dashaway Association (08p0) 84 Cal.
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to arise on an event that might possibly happen later than 21 years
and the period of gestation after the death of persons20 living
2
(2)
at the creation of the estate is void the day it is created.1
"Where property, real and personal, is given to trustees to hold and
to receive and invest the rents and profits of the real property and
the income of the personal property, and to deliver the property and
income at a certain or contingent future time to the beneficiaries, if
that time may possibly happen more than 21 years and the period of
gestation after the death of persons living at the creation of the trust,
and the gift of the accumulated fund are
the direction to accumulate
' 20 3
absolutely.
void
Neither of these rules would seem to prevent the creation of trusts
for indefinite periods, as A grants property to B in fee to control
and manage for C in fee, for each estate, the legal and equitable,
is vested in the respective parties, and they together may at any time
the trust, and together convey an absolute
if they choose terminate
20 4
title to the property.
A recent writer however has said "The courts in this country
seem to be moving very .-apidly toward the general announcement of
the rule that trusts of absolute indestructible equitable interests cannot be made to last for longer than lives in being and twenty one
years, and that any provision which may by any possibility postpone
the term of the trusteeship for longer than that period is wholly void
20 5

from the beginning."
It has been held in Illinois that where the trustees have the absolute power to sell at any time free of the rights of the beneficiaries,
the rule does not apply ;200 and likewise in Massachusetts, if the income is not to be accumulated, but distributed as it accrues, and
where the whole equitable interest is at.every moment vested absolutely in the shareholders, and can be sold by them at any time, the
rule does not apply ;207 but if the trustees and beneficiaries cannot
together convey205 the complete title without violating the trust, the
rule is violated.
In New York the statute provides that "Every future estate shall
be void in its creation which shall suspend the absolute power of
alienation for a longer period than two lives in being. ** * Such
2o'Rood, History of Real Property Law, § 27.
21 x8 Am. & Eng. Encyc. (ist Ed.) pP. 381-382.

20 Gray, .. C., Rule against Perpetuities, 2d Ed. (19o6) § 236.
"0 Kales, Transfer of Title to Real Estate, § 7921aHart v. Seymour (1893) 147 IlL 598.
21' Howe v. Morse (899) x74 Mass. 491, 55 N. E. 213.
157 Mass. 362; Young v. Snow
__ Xinsor v. Mills (1892),

(897)

167 Mass. 287.
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power of alienation is suspended when there are no persons in
being by whom an absolute fee in possession can be conveyed."
Under this statute it has been held that if the trust term is longer
than the period of two lives in being, but the trustees have at all
times the power to convey the complete title neither the rule nor
statute is violated.20 9 And where the trust is for the sole benefit of
the settlors or their appointees, the rule does not apply, even though
the beneficiaries are infants, or are numerous, and the entire interest cannot be disposed of without their consent.2 10
In New York, Michigan and Minnesota, the period seems to be
two lives only; in Wisconsin, two lives and 20 years; in California,
Idaho, North and South Dakota, the period is fixed by lives, in
being at the creation, but there is no limitation as to number; in all
other states the period is a "life or lives in being and 21 years thereThe lives specified may be those of trustees, existing
after."' -''
2

beneficiaries or strangers..

12

The following are illustrations: The term of the Boston and Worcester Electric Companies is "twenty years after the death of the
last survivor of 27 persons named in the agreement and declaration."2 13 In the Massachusetts Electric Companies "The trust is
to continue for the term of 21 years from the date of the agreement, unless the holders of at least two thirds of the shares then
outstanding shall at a meeting called for that purpose vote for its
termination or continuance."214 The Massachusetts Northern Rail'ze'ys put it: "The trust is to continue. for the term of twenty years
after the death of the last survivor of ten persons" named, six of
whom were the sons and daughters of the other four, three of whom
were trustees; but at any time by a vote of 2/3 of the outstanding
shares in a meeting called for the purpose, confirmed by the vote of
the property be
5/7 of the trustees, the trust can be terminated, 21 and
5
distributed, or be sold and proceeds distributed.
As has been pointed out a succession of trustees can be kept up
by means of joint tenancies, or by provisions in the trust-deed, or
if necessary to prevent failure by appointment of a court of equity,
2" Robert v. dorning (i882) 89 N. Y. 225; Henderson v. Henderson (x889) 113
N. Y. x.
N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Livingston
sOBeardsley v. Hotchliss (1884) 96 N. Y. 2o;
(1892) x33 N. Y. 125; Hope v. Brewer (2892) x36 N. Y. 126; Holmes v. Walter (po3)
ZI8 Wis. 409; Williams v. Montgomery (1896) 248 N. Y. 59.
2n Sears, Trust Estates etc., pp. 137-138.
212Crooke v. King's County (1884) 97 N. Y. 421; Bailey v. Bailey (1884) 97 N. Y.
460.

= Report of Special Committee of Mass. House Reps. No. 1788, p. 7.
24 lb. p. 8.
m Ib. p. 2s.
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2 18
for it is a maxim that a trust shall not fail for want of a trustee.
So too if there is not a special confidence in the person, instead of in
the office, of the trustee, no additional conveyances are necessary
the succession of powers, rights and duties in the
to keep up
21 T
trustees.
A little care in the drawing up the trust instrument2 18may make
the trust as convenient in this regard as the corporation.
This brings us to a consideration of the corporation and trust
obligations and liabilities. Here are important differences, in theory,
and great care is necessary in drawing trust agreements or there is
danger of unexpected or unusual liabilities.

Corporation Liabilities.
It results, of course, that because a corporation is a separate
person in the law, that its rights and obligations are its own, and not
those of any other persons. And this doctrine obtains universally
except when this corporate personality is used to "defeat public
'219
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime.
It follows of course that if the corporation is properly organized,
and the shareholders and officers do all they should do, and do
nothing they should not do, no one is liable except the corporation
for any obligations incurred. The theory is that the creditor must
look to the capital stock of the corporation for his protection; and
this capital stock is frequently called a "trust fund" for the protection of creditors. 220 Yet this trust fund doctrine has been bitterly
assailed, and it is held there is no liability on officers and shareholders, in the absence ot statutory provisions, unless there is
actual or constructive fraud, or ultra vires, or tortious or illegal acts
upon their part.2 21- Of course it is agreed that if there is a trust
fund, it is peculiar, tinlike ordinary trust funds, since there is no
21 Reichert v. Mission etc. Coal Co. (19o7)
v. Dodge

(rpo8)

Davis (r8g)

ro9 Md. x64, 71 Adt.

519,

231 Ill. 238, 12

Am. St. R. 307; Dodge

13o Am. St. R. 503, note So8; Smith v.

90 Cal. 25, 25 Am. St. R. 92; U. S. Casualty Co. v. Xacer -(902) 269

Mo. 302, 69 S. W. 370, 92 Am. St. R. 641.
2, Kadis v. Well (r913) x64 NT. C. 84, 80 S. ]E. 229. Compare Maryland Casualty
Co. v. Safe Deposit Co. (i922) xiS Md. 339, Ann. Cas. 1923 A x279, note.

Forms given in Sears, Cook (Corp. 7th Ed.), Conyngton (Corp. Organ.).
20 Smith v. Moore (1912) 299 Fed. 689. See also so Mich. Law Rev. 31o; 12 Col.
Law Rev. 496.
=-°Wood v. Dummer (1824) 3 Mason 3o8, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1847; Scovill v. Thayer
(1881) 105 U. S. 143, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 19o7; Shields v. Hobart (1903) 172 Mo. 492, 95
28See

Am. St. R.

529, 72 S.

-WV 669.

O'Bear jewelry Co. v. Volfer (2894) 2o6 Ala. 205, 54 Am. St. R. 32, 2 Wilgus,
Cases, :452; Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg. Co. (2892) 48 Minn. 174, 2 Wilgus, Cases,

19x; Hall v. Henderson (sgoo) 134 Ala. 455, 63 L. R. A. 673.
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separation of the legal and equitable titles, and no special trusts and
confidence existing between the corporation, corporate officers, or
shareholders, and corporate 'creditors. The corporation owns the
whole title legal and equitable to corporate property and the creditor
has, merely as such, no lien upon it either at law or in equity, at
least before insolvency.222 And so it is held by the great weight of

authority (in the absence of bankruptcy laws forbidding) that a
corporation can lawfully prefer its creditors, even stockholder and
22 3
director creditors, if it chooses, and there is no actual fraud..
Nevertheless it is to a fund designated capital, or capital stock,
and to that only, that creditors can look for protection. There is
however much confusion as to exactly what is included in this
fund. It perhaps can now be safely said to include all the corporate
property, real, and personal; tangible and intangible, choses in
possession and in action, up to an amount equal to the face value of
the outstanding stock, but yet not to that extent, if the corporate
capital has been 22
dissipated by misfortune, and not by fault of responsible parties.

4

There is however yet some uncertainty as to holding shareholders
liable for unpaid stock, or for stock issued for overvalued property,
or for dividends paid out of corporate capital.
New York has just held that under the law of that state shareholders in the absence of an agreement to pay up their stock, cannot be held by creditors to pay up. 225 As to payment of stock by
property, one line of authorities holds that in the absence of actual
fraud, established by the complainant, the judgment of the directors is final, 220 as where the three dummy incorporators and directors holding $3,000 of stock in the U. S. Steel Corporation, under
the New Jersey law passed a resolution that the property proposed
to be turned over to the company was equal in value to the face
value of the stock and bonds, $I,41O,OOO,OOO to be issued for it.
The Government experts however think there was $7oo,ooo,ooo
water in it. Another view is that it is only a question of fact to
be determined by a jury when the question is submitted to them
upon the facts put before them, and good faith will not protect;
21 Hollins v. Brierfield Coal Co. (1893) 15o U. S. 371, 2 Wilgus, Cases, z868.
=3 Catlin v. Eagle Bank (x826) 6 Conn. 233, 2 Wilgus, Cases, izS;
Corey v. Wadsworth (1897) 2z8 Ala. 488, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1836. Compare Rouse v. Merchants Nat].
Bank (1889) 46 0. S. 493, 15 Am. St. R. 644, 2 Wilgus, Cases, z8z9; Olney v. Conanicut
Land Co. (x889) x6 R. I. 597, 27 Am. St. R. 767, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1832.
4
22 Am. Life and Aec. Ins. Co. v. Ferguson (29g3)) 66 Ore. 417, 134 Pac. 1029; In
re Wells ]Estate (19r3) 156 Wis. 294, 244 N. V. 274.
Southworth v. Morgan (1912) 2o5 I. Y. 293.
2 Graves v. Brooks (z898) 127 Mich. 424, 2 Wilgus, Cases, x95o.
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another rule is that a large difference in the actual value of the
property and the face value of the stock issued is prima facie evidence of fraud and calls for explanation ;'2' and still another view
is that if the corporation is a "going concern," but nearly "gone,"
stock may be issued at a discount to takers in order to see, if per28
chance, it may be revived, at the expense of subsequent creditors.
So, too, while it was originally held that the directors could not pay
dividends to shareholders out of the corporate capital, yet our Supreme Court has held that where shareholders receive such dividends
in good faith, supposing'they were properly declared and paid out of
229
and the creditor
profits instead of capital they may keep them,
must whistle through the corporate whistle to the defaulting directors to -make good their loss.
Then too there are statutory efforts to protect creditors, which
for the most part are satisfactory to nobody. These are attempts
to make officers and stockholders liable for corporate: debts under
such varying circumstances that it is difficult to tell what the liability
231
23 0
primary or secondary, , limited
is, whether penal or contractual,
or unlimited, separate or joint, or on prior, existing, or subsequent
233
and whether enforceable outside of the state or
shareholders,
2 34
So too many states provide that all "fictitious issues of stock
not.
or bonds shall be void," yet courts have had great difficulty in giving
effect to such provisions, for if the effort to issue stock at a discount is void, the statute would then hurt creditors more than in any
23
other way, and defeat its own probable purpose. 5 On the other
hand Montana has a statute that provides that stock may be issued
any value, and such stock shall be
for mining property taken 2at
3'
up.
paid
wholly
be
to
deemed
21

See cases cited in State Trust Co. v. Turner (xgoo) ix Ia. 664, 82 N. W.
2 Wilgus, Cases, 1953. Compare i Cook, Corp., H§ 46-47.
139 U. S. 417, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1923.
Handley v. Stutz (891)

1029,

53

L. R. A. 136,

2'McDonald v. Williams (1899) 174 U. S. 397, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 298t.
Wiles v. Suydam (1876) 64 N. Y. 173, 2 Wilgus, Cases, x981.
2nUmsted v. Buskirk (1866) 17 0. S. 113, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 299o.

02Hanson v. Donkersley (1877) 37 Mich. 184, 2 Wilgus, Cises, x997.
2-311arger v. McCullough (1846) 2 Denio (N. Y.) 19, 2 Wilgus, Cases, x998; Bank

Ibbotson (1840) 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 473, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 2001;
120 Il. 35o, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 2003; Zang v. Wyant (1899)
Colo. 551, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 2005.
of Poughkeepsie v.

z5

Foot v. Sinnock (1887)

mMarshall v. Sherman (x895)
Angle (igoo)

148 N. Y. 9, 2 Wilgus, CaseS, 2021; Howarth v.

x62 N. Y. 179, 2 Wilgus, Cases. 2028; Whitman v. Oxford Bank (sgoo)

176 U. S. 559, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 208.
1_ Van Cleve v. Berkey (x898) 143 Mo. 1o9, 42 L. R. A. 593, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1953.
Compare x Cook, Corp., § 47.

2mCivil Code of Montana, § 3824, (Mar. 7, 1895).
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Trust Liabilities.
(a) Trustees liability: As has been pointed out, in a Trust, the
trustees are the owners of the property to the extent of any estate
necessary for them to have under the instrument of trust to enable
them fully to execute it. If it therefore gives to them full control,
they acts as owners
management, and disposition of the property,
3 7 It would naturally
do, as principals and not as agents of others.
follow from this that they bind themselves personally and themselves
alone, in the absence of some provision to the contrary. The debts
debts, not those of the beneficiaries,
they incur are their 2-personal
38
nor of the trust fund.
As was said by the United States Supreme Court in Taylor v.
Davis, 23 9 "When an agent contracts in the name of his principal,
the principal contracts and is bound, but the agent is not. When a
trustee contracts as such, unless he is bound no one is bound for
he has no principal. The trust estate cannot promise; the contract
is therefore the personal undertaking of the trustee. As a trustee
holds the estate, although only with the power and for the purpose
of managing it, he is personally bound by the contracts he makes as
trustee, even when designating himself as such. * * * Of course
when a trustee acts in good faith for the benefit of the trust he is
entitled to indemnity himself for his engagements out of the estate
in his hands." As for instance where a broker secured a loan for
the trustee for the benefit of the estate, the trustee promising to
the trust
pay the commission out of the trust fund, it was held that
2 40
And so
estate was not liable, but the trustee was personally.
with
payee
the
by
taken
was
where a note signed by A. B. Trustee,
trustee
the
yet
estate,
the
of
benefit
the
for
knowledge that it was
241
Hill on Trustees states the rule "A
was held personally liable.
trustee who carries on any trade with the trust assets for the benefit
of the cestuis que trust will be responsible to the 'creditors, not only
to the extent of the trust assets but also with the whole of his own
:2, Loring, Trustees Handbook, pp. 25-29; Ames, Cases, 2d Ed., pp. 278-281; Kenneson, Cases, pp. 147-152.

(igo) 12
"a Loring, Trustees Handbook, pp. 29-31; Dunlevie v. Spangenberg
Y. S. 299, 66 Misc. 354.
21 Taylor v. Davis (1884) 11o U. S. 330, 335.
6og, 29 Am. St. R. 63, note 67; Connally V.
240Johnson v. Leman (189o) 13! I.
Lyons (iSgi) 82 Tex. 664, 27 Am. St. R. 935; McIntyre v. Williamson (19oo) 72 Vt. 183,
47 At. 786, 82 Am. St. R, 929.

N.

2,1 Roger Williams Natl. Bank v. Groton Mfg. Co. (1889) x6 R. I. 5o4; Mitchell &
Co. v. Vhitlock (1897) 121 N. C. x66.
2 Hill, Trustees (Ed. 2846) p. 533; Woddrop v. Weed (s8g9 ) 154 Pa. St. 307, 35 Am.

St. R. 832.
21o

But see Wright v. Railroad Co. (igog)

Mass. 430, on 432.

xis

N. C.

529;

Curry v. Dorr (i912)
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property, and he may be made bankrupt and proceeded against in the
same manner as any other trader, and it is immaterial that the trade
is carried on by him in consequence of an express direction in the
trust instrument; although the trust property will doubtless be
first applied so far as it
primarily liable to creditors, and will 24be
2
will go in discharge of the liabilities.

This of course is directly contrary to the liability of corporate
directors, and is so different that, if it could not be modified it would
deter competent business men from accepting such trusts. Can a
to the con2' 4 3
trustee then exclude such liability by express stipulation
Bank v. Wood,
Leather
and
Shoe
In
can.
he
clear
is
trary? It
it was held that there was not personal liability upon the trustees
where they had executed a note reading "We as Trustees but not
individually promise to pay," signed by themselves "Trustees ;" and
it is ruled, in the words of the syllabus in Hussey v. Arnold, "No
action can be maintained against trustees, holding the property of
which
an unincorporated association, on a contract made by them
244
held in trust.)
property
the
against
only
enforceable
is
terms
by its
24 5
This has been more recently affirmed.

Upon the stationery of the Massachusetts Gas Companies, printed
in red ink, there appears the following, "The name 'Massachusetts
Gas Companies' is the designation of the Trustees for the time
being under an agreement and declaration of trust, dated 1902, and
all persons dealing with the Massachusetts Gas Companies must
look solely to the Trust property for the enforcement of any claim
against the Companies, as neither the Trustees, Officers nor shareholders assume any personal liability for obligations entered into
' 24
on behalf of the Companies." " In the Old South Building Trust

deed it is provided that "In every written order, contract or obligation which the Trustees shall give, authorize or enter into, it shall
be the duty of the Trustees to stipulate or cause to be stipulated that
neither the Trustees nor shareholders shall be held to any personal
247
liability under or by reason of such order, contract or obligation."
In some of the older cases the exemption of the trustee f-rom personal liability was placed upon the right of subrogation of the
so
creditor to the trustees right of indemnity, and to that alone;
his
exceeded
trustee
the
or
insolvent,
was
estate
that if the trust
2"

123

14 8
4

Mass. 148 (z877).
Mass. 202 (1904).

King v. Stowell (1912) 211 Mass. 246, 251.
: Sears, Trust Estates etc., p. 320.
4 Conyngton, Corporate Organization, pp. 548, 556.
2
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uthority the trustee was still personally4 8 liable. Perhaps he still is
n the latter case, but not in the former.
But how about the liability of the beneficiaries? This depends
ipparently upon whether they are really and truly, and individually,
)eneficiaries only. of an existing trust, or whether they are assoc-iated together in such a way as in fact to be partners engaged in
)usiness for profit, the trustees being not really the owners of the
property, but in substance and truth the agents of the associated
beneficiaries. There has been much consideration given to these
mhatters in Massachusetts.
-2 4
In Hoadley v. Commrs,

the question was whether transferable

3hares in a trust were taxable as corporate shares would be, i. e., at
the domicile of the owner, or where the trust property was located.
Held, the latter, since they were shares in a partnership. Here the
parties had "associated themselves to hold property and carry on
business," "as the McKay Sewing Machine Association," but no
member was to have any power to make any contract or transact
any business for the Association, which was itself 'to be the equitable owner, and "the general management of the business" was
"vested in an executive committee * * * to be chosen by the

whole body of shareholders at a meeting called by the trustee for
that purpose."
In Gleason v. McKay, 250 the same Association was involved, and
the question was whether the Association should be taxed upon all
its outstanding shares, as corporations were taxed. It was held not,
on the ground it was a partnership,without any corporate franchise,
and so not subject to the tax.
251
In Whitman v. Porter, subscribers associated themselves to-

gether to buy a ferry boat to be conveyed to one in trust, to be
managed by trustees and officers elected annually by subscribers,
who were to have transferable shares for their interests in the
"Agawam Ferry Co. ;" the plaintiff in the case was one of the shareholders, who had advanced money to pay notes given for the purchase of the boat and to pay expenses and asked for contribution
from the others, over and above their subscriptions to pay the
amount due. Held, it was substantially a partnership, and "as
between themselves they were ultimately liable in proportion to their
interests. But as to creditors, each was liable for the whole."
211Sears, Trust Estates, p. 40 et seq.; Loring, Trustees Handbook, p. 35.
210
zoSMass. 59 (1870).
134 Mass. 419 (1883).
07 Mass. 522 (871).
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In Phillips v. Blatchford,252 money was raised to carry on the
business of manufacturing grates, by sale of transferable certificates
under deed of trust providing the business was to be carried on by
a board of managers of whom the trustee was one, and the others
were to be elected by the shareholders. Held to be a partnership.
In Ricker v. Am. Loan & Trust Co.,2 3 another tax case, it was
held that where those who provided the money for purchasing and
selling cars, to be paid for in ten payments with six per cent interest,
were declared to be an Association with the interests represented
by transferable shares, the business to be managed by a board of
managers named, subject to removal by the shareholders and others
to be elected by them, the title of the property being taken in in
trust by an incorporated trust company, a partnership was created,
subject to taxation as other partnership .
So too, in William v. Boston,2 4 where a trust was organized to
purchase the site of the Museum of Fine Arts, to be held by trustees,
who should issue transferable shares to the subscribers, in whom
in meeting assembled, was vested the power to instruct the trustees
or remove them, and to alter or amend the declaration of trust, and
to direct the trustees to sell the property, and although the deed
specifically stated that neither the shareholders nor the trustees were
to be personally liable for any obligations of the Trust, yet it was
stated that a partnership for taxation purposes was created. In
the later case of Williams v. Milton (infra) it was said this was a
mistake, it was a trust and not a partnership.
255
an inventor transferred
On the other hand in Mayo v. Morit,
to him one-half of a
to
issue
were
his invention to trustees, who
specified amount of scrip or transferable shares, the other half to
be issued to subscribers who should furnish the trustees with money
for carrying on the business. The Trustees were to hold, manage
and dispose of the invention, as they thought best, and vacancies
among trustees were to be filled by the remaining trustees, held this
did not constitute a partnership.
The same view is taken in the still more recent case of Williams
v. Milton.2 'r

This is also a taxation case.

The Massachusetts

statute provides that personal property held in trust, shall be taxed
to the trustee where the beneficiary resides; and partners shall be
jointly taxed in the firm name, where the business is done; the
-,137
A 140
2"4io8
2u 151
2215

510 (1864).
346 (1885).
497 (1911).
481 (z8go).
Mass. 1 (1913).

M ass.
Mass.
Mass.
Mass.
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business was done in Boston which sought to tax the Trust as a
partnership doing business there.
The trust deed creating this Boston Personal Property Trust,
"expressly declared that a trust, and not a partnership is hereby
created; that neither the Trustees nor the cestuis que trustent shall
ever be personally liable hereunder as partners or otherwise, but
that for all debts the Trustees shall be liable as such to the extent
of the Trust Fund only. In all contracts or instruments creating
liability it shall be expressly stipulated that the cestuis que trustent
shall not be liable."
"The Trustees shall have as full power and discretion, as if absolute 6wners, to invest and reinvest the Trust Fund, in personal
property," to borrow money to extent of 25 per cent of property and
pledge as collateral security any personal property belonging to the
Trust Fund; to declare dividends in their discretion; to render an
annual account; to resign,--vacancies to be filled by remaining
trustees; to issue transferable certificates; to alter, add to or terminate the trust with the consent of three-fourths in interest of the
cestuis que trustent.
The court by LORING, J., said: "Where persons associate themselves together to carry on business for their mutual profit, they are
none the less partners because (i) their shares in the partnership
are represented by certificates which are transferable and transmissible, and because (2) as a matter of convenience (if not of necessity in case of transferable and transmissible certificates) the legal
title to the partnership property is taken in the name of a third
person. The person in whose name the partnership property stands
in such a case is perhaps in a sense a trustee. But speaking with
accuracy he is an agent who for the principal's convenience holds
the legal title to the principal's property.
After reviewing the Massachusetts cases above referred to, the
court points out that the difference between the partnership cases,
(the Hoadley, Whitman, Gleason, Phillips, Ricker and Williams
cases), on one hand and Mayo v. Moritz (the patent case) on the
other, lies in the fact that in the former cases the certificate holders
are associated together by the terms of the "trust" and are the
principals whose instructions are to be obeyed by their agent who
for their convenience holds the legal title to their property. The
property is their property. They are the masters. While in Mayo
v. Moritz on the other hand there is no association between the certificate holders. The property is the property of the trustees and the
trustees are the masters. All that the certificate holders in Mayo
v. Moritz had, was a right to have the property managed by the
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trustees for their benefit. They had no right to manage it themselves
nor to instruct the trustees how to manage it for them." The court
emphasizes that the only power the shareholders had was to consent
to an alteration of the trust deed, but they had no power to direct
or force the trustees to take any action. "It is the trustees, not the
certificate holders, who are the masters of the trust property."
Similar or even more liberal views have been taken by other
courts. The leading case on what constitutes a partnership is Cox
v. Hickman, decided by the House of Lords in 1860.257

In this case

failing merchants assigned all their assets to trustees to carry on the
business under the name of the company, for the benefit of creditors,
with their consent, the deed of trust authorizing the creditors to
accept the resignation of the trustees, appoint new ones, alter the
trusts or direct the business to be discontinued. The trustees incurred liabilities. Held the trustees were not the agents of the
creditors, and they were not liable as partners. There was perhaps
no association here, although something like a composition among
the creditors.
Very similar to the facts of Cox v. Hickman, is the well considered case of Wells-Stone Mercantile Co. v. Grover. Here by
a deed of trust made by a debtor to a trustee the latter was to convert
the property into money to pay the debtor's debts, make new purchasbs and carry on the business if he thought best. The creditors
consented to this. The creditors were sued by plaintiff for goods
sold to the trustee because he was authorized to make such purchases to keep up the stock. It was held, on demurrer, that neither
the original debtor, nor the creditors were liable because no power of
control was reserved over the trustee, and he was not 'the agent of
the debtor nor the creditors. The trustee and the estate only were
liable.
25 9
a deed of trust was
In the English case of Smith v. Anderson,
made between six persons as trustees and another who covenanted
for and on behalf of certain certificate holders, numbering over 20,
who had subscribed for thb purchase by the trustees of various
shares in other companies, all of which had been transferred to the
trustees, who were to issue transferable certificates therefor, upon
which 6 per cent'interest was to be paid from profits; the trustees
were to make and change investments, if authorized by certificate
holders, who were to have an annual meeting to hear reports and
m78 H. L. Cas. 268, g IEng. Rul. cas. 323.
28 7 N. D. 460 (1898), 41 L. R. A. 252, 75 N. W. 914.
canfile Co. v. Aultman (igoo) 9 N. D. Szo.
2* iS Ch. D. 247 (189o).

See also

Vells-Stone Mer-
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elect new trustees. Held there was no partnership, and the company was not illegal because it had not organized under the English
Companies, act, which required every "company, association or
partnership" carrying on business for gain by such company, association, or partnership, or by the individual members thereof, when
they exceed .0 in number, to be registered. Held, it was not a
partnership or company that required registration, and that the
trustees were not agents of the shareholders, and that it was the
trustees and not the shareholders who carried on the business.
2 60
The case of Johnson v. Lewis was similar.

The trust deed of

1873, was made between parties of the first part styled the trustees," others of second part called "the Committee," and others of
third part called "covenantees," these latter were subscribers to a
fund to purchase municipal bonds, to be purchased by the committee,
and put into hands of the trustees in trust to manage. The subscribers were to receive transferable certificates for their interests.
The court by CALDWELL, J., held: the trustees were the legal owners
of the trust property and the business of the trust was managed by
them; and the committee created by the deed for the benefit of the
certificate holders were strangers to each other and entered into
no- contract between themselves, nor with any trustee on behalf
of each other, and they were not therefore partners.
The Court of Appeals of New York have just recently held the
2
same way, in the case of Jones v. Gould. 3' Here Gould and two

others -were to purchase a line of railroad, extend the same, and
build another to coal lands to be purchased by them; they were to do
all acts necessary to construct or purchase said properties, and for
that purpose absolutely to control the property so to be constructed
or purchased as fully in all respects as if they were the absolute
owners thereof. The enumeration of the specific powers was not
to be construed as limiting the general powers conferred upon the
managers. By the agreement the defendants (Gould et al.) contracted to purchase the properties on such terms as they thought
the best obtainable, and, on the other hand, the subscribers agreed
with. each other and with the defendants (Gould et al.) to pay the
amounts of their respective subscriptions from time to time as
called for by the latter, but they were to be liable only to defendants,
and-then only to the amount of the subscription.
The court per curiam held, "We are of the opinion that under the
syndicate agreement the relation between the subscribers and the
20 6 Fed. 27 088o).
26'209 N. Y. 419, 103 N. F. 720 (1913).'
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managers (the defendants, appellant) was not that of principal and
agent (though doubtless fiduciary) but that the managers themselves became the principals in any contract which they might make."
There are many other cases to like effect. It seems therefore that
the usual personal liability of the trustees can be excluded by express provision brought home to every one dealt with; the cestuis
que trust, are not partners if the ownership and control of the fund
are left with the trustees; and by express provision brought home
to a dealer the Trust Fund alone can be made liable for the obligations of the trust.
I have referred to the provisions relating to capital stock of a
corporation, and pointed out some of the discordant theories in
reference thereto. It has been, in the main, a struggle between
persons on the one hand who have wished to capitalize visionary
prospective profits before their dreams were in fact realized, and if
disaster came, to get out from under, with some one else in possession of the hot air bag, 262 and the State's effort on the other hand to
make the actual capital, in the beginning come up to the manifesto,
or supplement this by other liabilities that frequently work unneces2 3
It certainly cannot be said
sary hardship upon honest business.
that the schemes so far devised have been satisfactory. Upon the
one hand they have been insufficient to accomplish their real purpose;
and upon the other, have been too inflexible and inelastic to encourage honorable and legitimate enterprise. The careful investor
in shares has difficulty to ascertain from statements of capital stock
much that aids him in getting at real values, while the careless one
is almost certain to be misled. The creditor also is in much the
same .predicament. The really careful investor or creditor, relies
actual property
not upon the capital stock statements but upon the 26
4
The Trust
and course of business of the particular institution.
for the most part proceeds upon a like theory. If one deals with
a Trust in reference to the Trust, it is made his duty in the absence of
express provisions otherwise, and if he has notice that he must look
to the Tr.ust property alone for security, to ascertain just what that
property is, without regard to any amount of nominal shares that

265
In other words the shares, few or many,
may be issued against it.

have nothing particularly to do with the property, but are only the
8

See dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Fuller in Handley v. Stutz (x 91) 139
U. S. 417, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1923, 1932.
20 Machen, A. V., "Do Corporation laws allow sufficient freedom to commercial
enterprise?" Maryland Bar Ass'n Report, 19G9, pp. 78-98.
See Cook, Corporations, 7th Ed. §§ 46-47.
Kisch v. Tozier (x894) 143 N. Y. 390, 42 Am. St. R. 729, note 733.
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method of indicating aliquot parts of the fund for the convenience
of the owners. The investor and the creditor both are expected to
act as business men do, and are required to do, when they are dealing with indiiduals, that is, rely upon their own investigation,
knowledge and judgment.
Different people will take different views as to the best policy,
in this regard. 2

6

Recently New York has provided for the issue of

corporate shares without par value, and has recognized the duty of
investor and creditor alike to rely upon his own judgment, instead
27
The
of upon the uncertain meaning of a fixed capital stock.
efficiency and validity of blue sky laws are yet "in nubibus," and
make corporate capitalization still more intricate,-and cloudy.2 8
While the right of inspecting corporate books by shareholaers is
now generally recognized, without any actual controversy being involved, such right, in the case of Trusts, can be fully recognized or
regulated by the trust deed provisions, as the stautory or common
law rules permit in the case of corporations.
In an article in the Atlantic Monthly, a short time ago, Mr.
F. L. S'rTSON, mentioned various disadvantages of corporations:

There are, said he (I) Taxation,-organization tax, franchise or
continuing tax, property tax, transfer tax, foreign state tax, and
Federal tax, nearly all of which are now imposed upon corporations,
and in addition thereto the shares of shareholders are frequently
taxed to the owner, if not ii the creating state, certainly to him
when he lives in another state.270 So, too, the franchise tax may be
imposed at home, and another privilege tax in each of the states
where the corporation does business, and these may be and frequently are higher than domestic corporations in the same business
pay, for a corporation does business, other than interstate commerce, in a foreign state by sufferance, comity as it is called,rather than by right.2 71

Property of course is taxed wherever it is,

'"See Burton, T. 1., Corporations and the State (1911); Stock Watering, W. Z.
Rililey, 26 Pol. Sci. Q. 98-121 (1ii); Capital of Corporations, G. NV. Wickercham, 2a
Harv. Law Rev. 319-338 (29o9); Overcapitalization, 38 Natl. Corp. Rep. 59 (29o9);
Stockwatering, 12 Bench and Bar, 43 (i908); Williams v. McClave (1914) 248 N. Y.
S. 93.
Shares Without Nominal or Par Value, Victor Morawetz, 26 Harv. Law Rev.
729 (1923).
2"Blue Sky Laws, F. A. Updike, 7 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 230-237 (19x3); Alabama
& N. 0. Transp. Co. et al. v. Doyle (2924) 210 Fed. 173.
20o Atl. Monthly, p. 27 et seq. (2922), July).
2 02 Wilgus, Cases, pp. 1370-1391; Farrington v. Tennessee (2877) 95 U. S. 679, 2
Wilgus, Cases, 1370.
-"Bank of Augusta v. Earle (1839) 13 Pet. (38 U. S.) 519, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1480;
Manchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Herriott (x899) 92 Fed. 711, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 2498, note
t502.
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but here the fiction that personal property follows the owner, is
often applied much more rigorously to corporations than to individuals. Shares are also subject to an inheritance tax, in the state
where the deceased lived, in the state where the corporation is incorporated, and according to some decisions also where the shares
are to be transferred. The transfer tax can be imposed wherever
the transfer is to be made.2 7 2 The Federal tax is now an income
tax, and of course would apply to the income of a Trust as well as
a corporation. The Supreme Court however held that the income
tax of 19o9, applied only to such associations "as are organized
under some statute, or derive from that source some quality or
benefit not existing at the common law," and Trusts were not so
organized and have no such quality.2 7 3 In Massachusetts after much
variety of opinion, the Supreme Judicial Court has finally ruled that
these institutions can be subjected to an excise tax under their
constitution, similar to corporations.2 74 Trust property is usually
taxed only to the trustee, who may indemnify himself out of the
trust estate.
Mr. STETSON points out also (2) that corporations are not protect-

ed under the 4th and 5th amendments as natural persons are, with
special reference to divulging incriminating information, discrimination against them, as to terms of doing business, and enforcing
claims. So also under the reserved power to repeal or amend corporate charters, many limitations and restrictions upon a corporation's power to contract can be and are imposed that would not be
27
valid if imposed upon citizens of the United States.

5

So a foreign

corporation as a creditor, unless it has entered a state and complied
with its laws in reference to doing business in the state, is not a
person within the jurisdiction, so as to be protected under the
M orrison v. Manchester (1879) 58 N. H. 538; Fowler v. Campbell soo Mich.
398; City of Detroit v. Lewis, 2o9 Mich. 155, 32 L. R. A. 439; Mills v. Thornton, 26

IIl. 300, 79 Am. Dec. 377; Matzenbaugh v. People, 194 Ill. xo8, 88 Am. St. R. 134;
Latrobe v. Mayor, ig Md. 13; Carry v. Baltimore, 96 Md. 310, 196 U. S. 466, 25 S. C.
297; Tappan v. Merchants' Bank, x9 Wall (U. S.) 490; Merriman's Estate, 147 Mich.
630; Estate of Palmer, 183 N. Y. 238; In re Ames Estate (1913) 141 N. Y. S. 793;
People v. Union Trust Co., 255 IIl. x68; Matter of Cooley, 186 N. Y. 220.
273Eliot v. Freeman (1i11) 220 U. S. 178.
27 In ie Opinion of Justices (s9o8) 19S Mass. 607, 84 N. E. 490; In re Opinion of
Justices (1911) 208 Mass. 6x6, 94 N. E. 1043; Compare S. S. White Dental Mfg. Co. v.
ComMw. (1912) 212 Mass. 35, 98 N. E. xo56 (Corp.); Keystone Watch Co. v. Commw.
212 Mass. So, 98 N. E. 2o63 (Corp.); Farr Alpaca Co. v. Commw. (1912) 212
(1912)

Mass. s56, 98 N. E. 1078 (Corp.); Baltic Mlin. Co. v. Commw.

(i923)

23! U. S. 68,

34 S. C. 15.
"'State v. Nashville etc. Ry. Co. (1912) 124 Tenn. 1, 135 S. W. 773, Ann. Cas. 1912
D. 8oS; Hale v. Henkel (x9o6) 201 U. S. 43; Wilson v. U. S. (spus) 221 U. S. 361;

McGuire v. Railway Co. (i9o6) 132 Ia. 340.
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clause that says "'no state shall deny to any. person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.- '- In almost all these
particulars, trustees being citizens of the United States and entitled
to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states,
would be protected more fully than a corporation. - -,; So too many
states attempt to exclude corporations doing business in the state
from suing in the Federal courts, and while they cannot actually
exclude them from the Federal Courts, they may oust the offending
corporation from the stateY
Mr. S'rzTSON also points out (3)the very great and unjust toll that
is paid by corporations in litigation because of prejudice against
them, exhibited by juries and legislators. In some degree at least this
would be less pronounced in the case of a Trust, where responsible
local citizens of standing were the trustees.
Upon the public side it was noted in the beginning that one of the
crying -weaknesses of corporations was the impersonal character, and
the lack of individual personal responsibility, especially toward the
public, that characterized it, and its actions. It might seem that
here the Trust would be superior; and it is more than probable that
so far as the relation of the Trustee toward the beneficiaries, is
concerned, there is under the rules of courts of Equity, a much more
positive and direct feeling of personal responsibility.
Toward the public, however, this may be doubted, for we have the
experience that all of our great industrial combinations, good and
bad, have almost without exception originated as Trusts, -under
Trust deeds such as we have been describing;229 and from this form.
20
case
held by the New York Court of Appeals, in the Sugar Trust

to be illegal as a partnership contrary to the right of a corporation
to be a member of such, and by the Supreme Court of Ohio in the
Standard Oil Case to be an institution in unlawful restraint of
trade, 28' those who then saw the handwriting on the wall fled in
hope to find legal shelter in the corporate form, only to find their
^ Blake v. McClung (igoo)
239, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 2036.

176 U. S. 59, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 2045; (x898)

17a

=?Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co. (1886) 27 Fed. 146;
31 Ind. 342, 2o N. E. 1093; Sears, Trust Istales etc., 194.
v. Smith (89)
=5Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co. (1876) 94 U. S. 535, 2 Wilgus, Cases,
Harrison v. St. Louis & S. F. Rt. Co. (1914) - U. S. -, 34 S. C. 333.
See cases in 212 Mass., and 231 U.
2w See i Wilgus, Cases, pp. 957-984.
note 274 above=People v. North River Sugar Ref. Co. (x89o) 12 N. Y. 582, 1 Wilgus,
Ioo, note lo9.
^n State v. Standard Oil Co. (1892) 49 0. S. 137, 34 Am. St. Rt. 541.
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hope in vain. 2S 2 Neither trust nor corporate form where restraint
of trade is the end of the organization, can stand the searching
destroy either under the common law
power of the government to
28 3
or under the anti-trust acts.

Massachusetts has through Commissioners made investigations of
these Express Trusts, and after two reports, enacted legislation providing for the filing with the Railroad Commission of all deeds of
trust for such Associations, and in the case of Trusts for owning
shares in railway, street railway and electric railway companies, or
which are managed by the same parties, making annual reports-to,
and making them subject to examination by, the Railroad Commission. The same power is given also to the Gas Commission in
reference to gas, electric light, and power companies.
If the foregoing review is accurate, it would seem that, largely
because of the variety, uncertainty, and confusion arising from conflicting legislative provisions, the Trust form of organization, at
-least upon the private side, is more simple, certain, consistent and
yet flexible, and perhaps with even more satisfactory safeguards
available both to the investor and the creditor, than is the corporation.
Upon the public side, however, so far as control is concerned, the
State can reach an offending cor1poration more directly and positively, notwithstanding the Trust form of organization was
abandoned for the corporate form, with the belief that in that way
anti-trust laws could be evaded.
So far as any feeling of direct personal responsibility toward the
public as a whole is concerned, there does not seem to be much
difference. The psychology of the group mind seems to be inherently
different from that of a single individual. It will seek and accomplish ends from which individuals will shrink. As the non-explosiveso.
glycerine; nitric and sulphuric acids and saw-dust mixed, make the
explosive dynamite, so does the combination of the intelligent, the
stupid, the selfish and unselfish, the honest and the dishonest, into
one group, give a resultant that when quiescent usually does much
better than the worst, yet from hidden powers often does much
worse than the worst. 2 6 Undoubtedly much could be done to make
Distilling & Cattle Feeding Co. v. People (1895)

=
978.

156 Ill. 448,

Cases,
Wilgus,
,

193 U. S. 2o; Standard Oil Co. v.
. Northern Securities Co. v. U. S. (903)
U. S. (191o) 221 U. S. x; U. S. v. Am. Tobacco Co. (r9xo) 221 U. S. io6.
2sASee chapters 454, 509, and 596 of Public Acts of 1913.
sDistilling and Cattle Feeding Co. v. People (x895) x56 Ill. 448, 47 Am. St. R.
x Wilgus, Cases, 978.
'

LeBon, The Crowd, pp. 2-44.
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our corporation laws, more simple, certain and flexible; and a
would help corporaproperly worked out Federal incorporation la V
and furnish a model
respects,
many
in
business
extensive
with
tions
for state legislation.
When laws are uncertain, or unduly hamper legitimate enterprise,
bright minds will invent methods to accomplish unexpected ends.
In the early years of our history, there was great prejudice against
the incorporation of banks, and there were either no laws permitting
it or if there were any, they were such as were difficult to comply
with. The brilliant services of Alexander Hamilton, and of Aaron
Burr were called in requisition to devise plans for the institution of
banks in New York City. Hamilton drew up a masterly paper which
with a few words changed-directors to trustees, shareholders to
beneficiaries, and a few others, would still be a model form for a
Trust for business purposes, such as we have been considering, and
which was the constitution of the Merchants Bank for 2o years, until
the legislature forbade banking in any but the corporation form.
On the other hand Aaron Burr engineered a bill through the New
York legislature to incorporate a company to supply the city of New
York with ,water, and with authority to use its surplus capital "in
any way not inconsistent with the laws and constitutions of the
United States and New York." Under this charter, so it is stated,
2 88
for 115 years.
the Manhattan Bank has been carrying on business
These perhaps are typical illustrations as to what lawyers are
called upon to do, and the methods sometimes resorted to. The one
statesman-like, constructive, and within the law. The other unstatesman-like, destructive,,and if within the law at all, only so by
taking advantage of its uncertainty, to thwart the expressed will of
the people.
Perhaps these things can never be wholly overcome until men are
made over. All production is the result of the combination of forces
within man, with forces and -things outside him, of persons and
property. From the beginning of time some men in whom the
sense of brotherhood was latent or unborn, have always classed
other men as external things to be used or exploited as other
property, and have considered it proper to take all that their
strength, their wit or their cunning enabled them to take; others
have believed that they should take no more from the common
fund than they had contributed to it; still others that they should
contribute to it all their ability and their skill would enable them to
2" Hamilton's Works, vol 7, pp. 838-844; Sears, Trust e states, etc., p. 341.
"sCentury Magazine, May, 1899; Parton's Life of Burr, p. 238.
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do, and take from it only what they needed. There is no doubt but
these
that the trend of the ages has been practically from the first of
the
of
years
recent
toward the second, and perhaps in the more
much
not
if
least,
at
ideally
Christian era, there has been a trend
ends
practically, toward the third. As one or the other of these
laws
the
of
administration
the
and
nature
the
will
so
are dominant
none
But
be.
be. And so will the institutions founded upon them
will be perfect until men are perfect.
H. L. WILGUS.
Unviversity of Michigan.

